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Abstract
Our first review paper on the occasion of the centennial anniversary of Gestalt psychology focused
on perceptual grouping and figure-ground organization. It concluded that further progress requires
a reconsideration of the conceptual and theoretical foundations of the Gestalt approach, which is
provided here. In particular, we review contemporary formulations of holism within an
information-processing framework, allowing for operational definitions (e.g., integral dimensions,
emergent features, configural superiority, global precedence, primacy of holistic/configural
properties) and a refined understanding of its psychological implications (e.g., at the level of
attention, perception, and decision). We also review four lines of theoretical progress regarding
the law of Prägnanz—the brain’s tendency of being attracted towards states corresponding to the
simplest possible organization, given the available stimulation. The first considers the brain as a
complex adaptive system and explains how self-organization solves the conundrum of trading
between robustness and flexibility of perceptual states. The second specifies the economy
principle in terms of optimization of neural resources, showing that elementary sensors working
independently to minimize uncertainty can respond optimally at the system level. The third
considers how Gestalt percepts (e.g., groups, objects) are optimal given the available stimulation,
with optimality specified in Bayesian terms. Fourth, Structural Information Theory explains how a
Gestaltist visual system that focuses on internal coding efficiency yields external veridicality as a
side-effect. To answer the fundamental question of why things look as they do, a further synthesis
of these complementary perspectives is required.
Note: This is a pre-publication draft (dated May 7, 2012) of the second paper of a twin set of review papers accepted for publication in
Psychological Bulletin. Please do not distribute or cite without permission from the first author.
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Introduction
From the very beginning, the following ideas were central to Gestalt thinking. Phenomenal
experience consists of part-whole structures, configurations, or “Gestalten.” A Gestalt is an
integrated, coherent structure or form, a whole that is different from the sum of the parts.
Gestalts emerge spontaneously from self-organizational processes in the brain. Gestalts
result from global field forces that lead to the simplest possible organization, or minimum
solution, given the available stimulation. With this simplicity or minimum principle (also
known as the law of Prägnanz) the Gestaltists found themselves in opposition to the
likelihood principle advanced by von Helmholtz: the idea that the visual system interprets,
through some unconscious inference mechanism, incoming proximal stimuli in terms of the
most likely distal source that might have given rise to these proximal stimuli.
In the first half of the 20th century, Gestalt psychology struggled with several foundational
problems arising from vaguenesses in the research agenda: the inability to precisely define
terms like emergence and Prägnanz, the inability to quantify the minimum principle and thus
to make specific behavioral predictions, the lack of methodological tools for
operationalizing these notions, and the difficulty of articulating testable theories or models
of the underlying neural mechanisms. All of these shortcomings led to growing
dissatisfaction with the Gestalt program of research in the 1950s and 1960s, and the
subsequent decline of its impact on research in perception and the rest of psychology. In our
first paper on the occasion of 100 years of Gestalt psychology (Anonymous Author List,
2012), we have demonstrated how some of these shortcomings were already alleviated in
more contemporary research, performed in the Gestalt spirit, on perceptual grouping and
figure-ground organization. Specifically, it was shown that psychophysical and
computational work on grouping, using carefully constructed stimuli, allowed for
quantification of grouping principles. Furthermore, experiments with richer stimuli than
previously used revealed new grouping and figure-ground principles, as well as their
interactions with other aspects of visual processing (e.g., attention and shape perception).
Finally, it was shown how grouping and figure-ground organization could be related to
computational principles, ecological statistics, and neural mechanisms.
The present review complements the first one (Anonymous Author List, 2012) by describing
the progress made regarding the core notions from Gestalt theory—holism, emergence, the
primacy of the whole, the minimum principle or law of Prägnanz, and self-organizing
dynamics. First, we clarify the conceptual foundations of Gestalt thinking by refining
notions such as holistic properties, emergent features, configural superiority, and global
precedence—relying mainly on operational definitions fitting into a more contemporary
information-processing framework (Section 2). Afterwards, we illustrate recent progress
regarding the deeper theoretical foundations of the Gestalt framework by reviewing models
that implement, and thereby explain, Gestalt principles as on-going dynamics (Section 3)
and from three considerations of economy: in the use of neural sensors (Section 4), in terms
of Bayes’ theorem (Section 5), and in symbolic descriptions which allow for a dynamic
implementation (Section 6). For a more detailed list of contents, see Appendix 1.
Although the discussed models pertain to specific perceptual topics such as perceptual
switching, apparent motion, object formation, and visual regularity, Sections 3–6 focus on
generic theoretical frameworks such as dynamical systems theory, complex adaptive
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systems, measurement theory, the Bayesian approach to perception, and neural networks. A
review of these approaches might also be useful to psychologists who are not primarily
interested in visual perception, but are intrigued by the Gestalt approach to psychological
theory. We hope that casting a range of current perspectives on the issues raised in Gestalt
psychology will contribute significantly towards a synthesis between previous oppositions
(e.g., regarding flexibility versus stability, intrinsic versus extrinsic processes, simplicity
versus likelihood), but the current status of the field does not allow for such a synthesis yet.
Only the first steps in this direction are taken in this paper. In the main body of the paper, we
explicitly point out the interrelations between different theoretical notions and views, but a
more integrative summary is provided only in the final, concluding section of the paper. We
start our review with a discussion of historical and contemporary views on holism, a
fundamental notion of Gestalt psychology.
Holism
Holism in Traditional Gestalt Psychology
Gestalt psychologists argued that perceptual experiences are intrinsically holistic and
organized. They forcefully rejected the proposal by structuralism (Wundt, Titchener)—
rooted firmly in British empiricism—that perceptions are constructed from atoms of
elementary, unrelated local sensations that are unified by associations due to spatial and
temporal contiguity. The Gestalt theorists rejected both atomism and associationism, as well
as any summative approach as an account for the experience of structured wholes. This was
most clearly visible in Wertheimer’s (1912) phi motion, in which pure motion could be seen
without actually seeing any object moving. In our first paper (Anonymous Author List,
2012), the historical significance of this discovery was discussed as the roots of the Berlin
school of Gestalt psychology and its distinction from the Graz school. Here, we offer a brief
description of the essential theoretical claims.
Wertheimer (1924/1938, p. 2) described holism as the “fundamental formula” of traditional
Gestalt psychology: “There are wholes, the behavior of which is not determined by that of
their individual elements, but where the part-processes are themselves determined by the
intrinsic nature of the whole.” A specific sensory whole is qualitatively different from what
one might predict by considering only its individual parts, and the quality of a part depends
upon the whole in which this part is embedded (e.g., Köhler, 1930/1971). The proposition
most often stated as characterizing Gestalt theory that “the whole is more than the sum of its
parts” is inaccurate. It is more correct to say: “The whole is something else than the sum of
its parts, because summing is a meaningless procedure, whereas the whole-part relationship
is meaningful” (Koffka, 1935, p. 176).
The idea that sensory wholes possess properties that cannot be derived from the properties
of their constituents was not the discovery of Gestalt psychology. Before the advent of
Gestalt theory, Christian von Ehrenfels (1890/1988) called attention to the fact that
perceptual experiences, such as perception of melody or the shape of a visual object, are
more than the mere sum of their independent components. To account for such perceptual
experiences, von Ehrenfels postulated a new sort of element, which he termed Gestalt
quality (“Gestaltqualität”). The Gestalt quality is superadded to our experiences of sensory
elements. Gestalt qualities exist alongside or above the fundamental independent
constituents with which they are associated.
The Berlin school’s view of holism was more radical. Rejecting the premise that the sum of
sensory elements constitutes the primary foundation of perceptual experience, Wertheimer
(1922/1938) objected to any summative account in which “something” is added to the sum
of sensory elements, be it von Ehrenfels’s qualities, “relations-between-elements”, or higher
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mental operations imposed on the sensory elements to produce unity. Rather, he argued that
we directly and immediately perceive Gestalten: integrated, structured wholes the properties
of which are not derived from its individual parts or their simple sum and within which
constituent parts are in dynamic interrelations, such that the specific functions and properties
of the parts can only be defined in relation to the whole.
This formulation raises many deep questions regarding the functional relationships between
parts and wholes and how they might continuously change through their dynamic
interrelationships (e.g., Grelling & Oppenheim, 1938; Rausch, 1937; Smith, 1988). In
general, it is useful to distinguish Gestalt parts (in a person’s perception) from stimulus parts
(in the environment). Gestalt parts evolve from an interaction among the representations of
stimulus parts, even if the stimulus parts themselves do not change, so that the whole
determines how a stimulus part is perceived and whether it becomes a Gestalt part.
Modern Approaches to Holism
The traditional Gestalt view on part-whole relations summarized above may appear
somewhat fuzzy to modern readers, who are used to specific operational definitions. These
have been offered by more recent researchers, working in an information-processing
framework. We review four of these notions here: (1) Garner’s dimensional integrality, (2)
emergent features and configural superiority, (3) global precedence in hierarchical patterns,
and (4) the primacy of holistic or configural properties.
Garner’s dimensional integrality—One notion central to Gestalts is that whatever parts
(features, elements), if any, they may contain, these parts are perceived holistically rather
than separately or independently. Garner (1962, 1974; Garner, Hake, & Eriksen, 1956)
looked for empirical support from converging operations, starting with elementary 2-D
stimuli, in which each of the given dimensions A and B possess two levels, 1 and 2,
resulting in four stimuli: A1B1, A1B2, A2B1, and A2B2. If Dimension A were color with
1=red and 2=green, and B were shape with 1=circle and 2=square, the four stimuli would
be: red circle, green circle, red square, green square. The first converging operations tested
whether perceivers could make speeded judgments of (say) color without experiencing
interference from uncorrelated variation on shape in a sequence of stimuli; if not, they would
experience what is now called Garner interference, meaning that one dimension was not
being perceived independently from the other. A second convergence tested whether two
stimuli that differed (redundantly) in both dimensions could be discriminated from each
other more quickly than could two stimuli differing in just one dimension. If so, and if the
magnitude of that redundancy gain exceeded what would be created by mere horse-race
statistics, that too would indicate that the dimensions were not being perceived separately or
sequentially but were instead perceived jointly. A third convergence tested performance in
divided attention tasks: If perceivers could make classification judgments that required
perceiving both dimensions as well as or better than judgments based on only one, that
would indicate they could divide their attention across both dimensions simultaneously
(Garner, 1974).
The results showed that some stimulus dimensions, such as shape and color, are perceived
separately: They show no Garner interference, no significant gains from redundancy, and
worse performance in divided attention tasks than in selective attention tasks. Such
dimensions further showed “city block” metrics on similarity judgments (the perceived
dissimilarity of two stimuli is the simple sum of their dissimilarities on the two dimensions).
Garner (1974) called these dimensions separable; for them, the whole does indeed resemble
the sum of its parts.
Wagemans et al. Page 4
Psychol Bull. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2013 July 30.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
Other stimulus dimensions, such as the hue and saturation of a single color chip, revealed a
pattern of results he called integral: They show both Garner interference and redundancy
gains, but again they show poor performance on divided attention tasks relative to selective
attention. In addition, integral dimensions show Euclidean metrics on similarity judgments:
The similarity of two stimuli is determined by the length of the diagonal connecting them in
2-D space. The interpretation is that integral dimensions are perceived together,
simultaneously, in a way in which the separate dimensions have no psychological primacy.
Shape dimensions, such as curvature and elongation, are often perceived as integral
dimensions, even though they can be defined mathematically in independent terms, but one
can use Garner’s procedure to psychophysically calibrate the dimensions and make them as
separable as possible (Ons, De Baene, & Wagemans, 2011).
For some stimuli, Dimension A is integral with respect to B, but B is separable with respect
to A. Garner called these asymmetrically integral dimensions. Still other stimulus
dimensions are called configural when they show Garner interference, no redundancy gains,
but better performance on divided attention than on selective attention tasks. An example
would be the four stimuli generated from pairs of parentheses: ((, (),)(, and)). Such stimuli
seem to be perceived via neither integral nor separable processing of their individual curved
segments but rather via emergent features such as bilateral symmetry, parallelism, and
closure (Pomerantz & Garner, 1973).
Emergent features and configural superiority—Emergent Features or EFs are
features that are possessed by wholes—groups of parts—but not by any individual part nor
by any single group of parts. Thus, they emerge when parts combine into wholes. Wholes
can have fewer or more Gestalt qualities because they possess fewer or more EFs. If a set of
trees is closely spaced, proximity and similarity lead them to be grouped visually into a
whole forest, and that forest has properties (such as density) not possessed by any individual
tree. If the trees are planted into regularly-spaced rows, however, they now gain EFs such as
collinearity and symmetry that go beyond the mere clumping of parts into bunches. Wholes
with yet stronger Gestalt qualities show EFs that are unpredictable and even surprising,
characteristics central to the notion of emergence itself (e.g., the Dalmatian dog once it is
seen to stand out from the rest of the scene; see Figure 13 in Gallace & Spence, 2011).
Let us start with the simplest of all stimuli, a single dot, and assume that its only
distinguishing feature is its location. If we add a second such dot, we then add its location as
a second feature, but we also add interdot distance and angle as two EFs not possessed by
either individual dot, though they are derivable from the dots’ positions. We can also start
with a single line segment as a stimulus, with length and orientation as distinctive features in
addition to its location. If we add a second segment, we add its location, length and
orientation, but we also gain EFs such as the distance and angle between the two lines and
further EFs such as the type of intersection they form if they touch (T, L, X, etc.) and
possibly forms of parallelism, collinearity, and symmetry as well.
With stimuli of greater complexity, there are an infinite number of logically possible EFs
that can be imagined. With a face, for example, the ratio of the diameter of the left pupil to
the width of the mouth is an EF not possessed by the eye or the mouth alone, but it is
unlikely that perceivers would attend to such an EF, so only a subset of EFs are likely to be
perceived (i.e., have psychological reality). For instance, two line segments always create a
specific angle, but only certain angles are particularly salient, such as zero degrees, which
denotes either that the lines are parallel or collinear. Research has shown that humans and
some lower animals are exquisitely sensitive to parallelism and collinearity, which also
serve as quasi-regularities in the case of small deviations from zero degrees (e.g., Kukkonen,
Foster, Wood, Wagemans, & Van Gool, 1996; Wagemans, Van Gool, Lamote, & Foster,
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2000). When a third line segment is added, new EFs become possible such as closure, to
which visual systems are also quite sensitive (Chen, 2005; Anonymous Author List, 2012,
Section 4). Importantly, no matter how many relational properties are “added” to the
originally local and basic features, these EFs may be merely sufficient for perceiving a
global Gestalt, not necessary: They may form the basis for it, but they cannot be the cause of
it.
Only some of these EFs also give rise to Configural Superiority Effects or CSEs (Pomerantz,
Sager, & Stoever, 1977), which can be used as an index to indicate when wholes are
perceived before parts (“forest before trees”). The easiest test for CSEs starts with
benchmarking performance in a baseline task of localizing a singleton (or “odd one out”) in
a search display, e.g., finding a single B in a display otherwise consisting of As. Then an
identical context stimulus C is added to each element so the task is now to locate the sole
BC in a field of ACs. Normally, adding identical, non-informative context hurts
performance because it makes the stimuli more similar (in addition to increasing overall
processing load and possibly introducing masking or crowding). That is the case with these
letter stimuli: Participants take longer to find the BC in a field of ACs than to find the B in a
field of As.
With other parts substituted for A, B, and C, however, the opposite result can arise, which
constitutes evidence for configural superiority. If diagonal line segments and an L-shaped
corner are used for A, B, and C so that the diagonals combine with the Ls to form arrows
and triangles, perceivers are more than twice as fast to spot the target (Figure 1A). When
these same parts are shifted just slightly in position, however, the CSE is lost (Figure 1B).
Similar effects arise with pairs of parentheses (Figure 1C and D).
The key factor in obtaining a CSE appears to be the creation of salient emergent features
when the context C is added to the base elements A and B. With the arrows and triangles of
Figure 1A, those EFs appear to be closure, number of terminators, and type of intersection.
Some of the strongest, most robust CSEs discovered involve topological EFs such as
presence versus absence of holes, connectivity, and inside-outside relationships (Chen,
2005). (For more CSEs and a new framework called the Theory of Basic Gestalts, see
Pomerantz & Portillo, 2011.)
Global precedence—Navon’s (1977) global precedence hypothesis states that processing
proceeds from global structures towards analysis of local properties. This hypothesis was
formulated within a framework that views a visual object as represented by a hierarchical
network with nested relationships. The “globality” of a visual property corresponds to the
level it occupies within the hierarchy: Properties at the top of the hierarchy are more global
than those at the bottom, which are in turn more local. Consider a face defined by spatial
relationship between facial components (e.g., eyes, nose, mouth), which are, in turn, defined
by relationships among their subparts. The spatial relationship between the components is
more global than the specific shapes of the components, and in turn, the relationship
between the subparts of a component is more global than the specific properties of the
subparts. The global precedence hypothesis claims that the order of processing of an object
is from global to local: Global properties of a visual object are processed first, followed by
analysis of local properties. It has been tested with hierarchical patterns, in which larger
figures are constructed from smaller figures (first introduced by Asch, 1962 and later by
Kinchla, 1974, 1977). An example is a set of hierarchical letters: large letters constructed
from the same set of smaller letters having either the same identity as the larger letter or a
different identity. Hierarchical patterns like these satisfy two conditions, which are critical
for testing the hypothesis (Navon, 1977): First, the global and local structures can be
equated in familiarity, complexity, codability, and identifiability, so they differ only in level
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of globality, and second, the two structures can be independent, so that one structure cannot
be predicted from the other.
In a popular paradigm, observers are presented with hierarchical stimuli and are required to
identify the larger (global) or the smaller (local) letter, in separate blocks of trials. Findings
of global advantage—faster identification of the global letter than the local letter and
disruptive influence from irrelevant global conflicting information on local identification
(global-to- local interference)—are taken as support for global precedence (e.g., Navon,
1977, Experiment 3). Much subsequent research has concentrated on delineating the
boundary conditions of the global advantage effect and examining whether its locus is
perceptual or post-perceptual (for reviews, see Kimchi, 1992; Navon, 2003). Several factors
can modulate the effect, including overall size, eccentricity, spatial uncertainty, elements’
sparseness, number of elements, relative size of elements, figural goodness, exposure
duration, and attention allocation. Research indicates that the global advantage—when it
occurs—arises at the perceptual level, although the effect can be magnified by post-
perceptual, response-related processes.
Overall, global advantage is normally observed with the typical hierarchical stimuli used in
the global-local paradigm to the limits of visibility and visual acuity. Nonetheless, to the
extent that global advantage implies global precedence, the fact that global advantage is
obtained only under certain conditions suggests that global precedence is not a universal
law. Two main issues have been raised concerning the interpretation of global advantage.
One issue concerns the hierarchical patterns that are the cornerstone of the global-local
paradigm. Hierarchical patterns provide an elegant control for many intervening variables
while keeping the hierarchical structure transparent, but the local elements of the
hierarchical patterns do not really form the parts of the whole (Kimchi, 1992; Navon, 2003).
Furthermore, it has been argued that the local elements in the Navon type of hierarchical
patterns function merely as “place-holders” (Pomerantz, 1983) or serve just to define texture
(Kimchi & Palmer, 1982; Pomerantz, 1983, but see Navon, 2003). If so, the local elements
may not be represented as figural units, and consequently, faster identification of the global
form may be accounted for, not by its level of globality but by a qualitative difference in
identification of a figural unit versus a texture element. However, a study of the
development over time or microgenesis of the perception of hierarchical stimuli, using a
primed matching paradigm (Kimchi, 1998) showed that the global form was primed at brief
exposures, whereas the local elements were primed only at longer exposures, suggesting that
the global form is effective already early in the perceptual process, followed by the
individuation of the local elements.
The second issue is that relative size alone rather than globality could explain the global
advantage (e.g., Kinchla & Wolfe, 1979; Navon & Norman, 1983). Navon (2003, p. 290)
has argued that globality is inherently confounded with relative size—it is a fact of nature
that relative size is “an inherent concomitant of part-whole relationship.” This is indeed the
case if global properties are properties of a higher level unit. Yet, if global properties depend
on the relationship between the elements, as the theoretical motivation for the global
precedence hypothesis implies (e.g., Navon 1977, 2003), then the essential difference
between global properties and component properties is not in their relative size. For
example, to distinguish “squareness” from its component vertical and horizontal lines, or
“faceness” from its facial components, based only on their relative sizes would miss the
point.
The vast majority of results demonstrate that perceptual processing can proceed from global
structuring towards analysis of local properties under certain conditions (hence, “global
precedence”). Further findings also suggest that there are different kinds of wholes with
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different kinds of parts and part-whole relationships. Consider a face with its eyes, nose, and
mouth, versus a wall of bricks. Both are complex visual objects—wholes—but the eyes,
nose and mouth of a face are its parts, whereas the bricks in the wall are mere constituents. It
is therefore possible that global precedence characterizes the course of processing of some
wholes but not of others. This cries out for a refinement of the terminology (e.g., global
versus holistic/configural properties) and a reconsideration of the primacy of holistic
properties, which may not necessarily reside strictly in temporal precedence. This is
provided in the next section.
The primacy of holistic properties—The Gestaltists’ claim that wholes have properties
that cannot be derived from the properties of their constituents is captured in modern
cognitive psychology by the notion of holistic or configural properties. Holistic properties
are emergent properties that cannot be predicted by considering only the individual
component parts or their simple sum. Rather, they arise from the interrelations between the
parts comprising strong configurations. Examples are symmetry, regularity, and closure
(Garner, 1978; Kimchi, 1992, 1994; Pomerantz, 1981; Rock, 1986; Wagemans, 1995, 1997).
Thus, for example, four line segments that vary in orientation can configure into a square—
with a configural property of closure—or into a cross—with a configural property of
intersection. Holistic properties exist along with, not instead of, component properties, and
are a different aspect of a stimulus (Garner, 1978). The Gestaltists’ claim that wholes
dominate parts finds its modern counterpart in the hypothesis about the primacy of holistic
properties, which states that holistic properties dominate component properties in
information processing.
Empirical research pitting holistic against component properties (with proper controls for
differences in discriminability) provides converging evidence for the primacy of holistic
properties (see Kimchi, 2003, for a review). For example, holistic properties have been
found to dominate speeded classification and discrimination performance, regardless of the
discriminability of the components (Kimchi, 1994), to be accessible to rapid search (Rensink
& Enns, 1995), and to be available for priming under very short exposure durations (Kimchi,
2000). Also related is the configural superiority effect (Pomerantz et al., 1977), described
above. In light of this, it is hardly tenable that the whole is perceived just by assembling
components. However, several findings suggest that positing holistic primacy as a rigid
perceptual law is hardly tenable either. Configural dominance has been found with some
configurations but not others (e.g., Pomerantz, 1981), and the relative dominance of
configural properties versus component properties has been found to depend on its relevance
to the task at hand (e.g., Han, Humphreys, & Chen, 1999; Pomerantz & Pristach, 1989).
Furthermore, the description of holistic/configural properties as “emergent” is only
supported as a description of the stimulus. There is no necessity that emergent properties be
derived perceptually, because they may be directly detected by the perceptual system rather
than being computed from relevant properties of the components. Thus, both component and
holistic properties (whether “emergent” or not) must be treated as stimulus aspects. Whether
holistic properties dominate component properties at a certain level of processing, or are
extracted earlier than component properties, are ultimately empirical questions, as long as
the concepts are clearly defined and the methods are available to address them. For instance,
phenomenological notions such as configural superiority and dominance of the whole over
the parts suggest that perceptual processing is guided by the quality of wholes, which does
not imply a specific processing order, but which does suggest that attentional processing
proceeds from wholes to parts.
Although the terms are often used interchangeably, global and holistic properties can be
distinguished on theoretical and empirical grounds. Global properties are defined by the
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level they occupy within the hierarchical structure of the stimulus. The difference between
global and local properties (as operationally defined in the global/local paradigm) involves
size: Global properties are by definition larger than local properties because the global
configuration is necessarily larger than the local elements of which it is composed. The
critical difference between holistic properties and component properties, however, is not
their relative size. Holistic properties are relational properties that arise from the
interrelations among the component properties of the stimulus.
To examine whether the distinction between global and holistic properties has psychological
reality, we must dissociate level of globality (global vs. local) from type of property (holistic
vs. nonholistic). With hierarchical stimuli, different types of properties may be present at the
global and the local levels. Accordingly, Kimchi (1994) employed hierarchical stimuli that
varied in configural properties (e.g., closure) and basic, non-configural properties (e.g., line
orientation) at the global or the local level. The orthogonal combination of type of property
and level of structure produced four sets of four stimuli each (Figure 2). Participants
classified a set of four stimuli on the basis of the variation at either the global or the local
level of the stimuli (global or local classification task). Depending on the stimulus set,
classification (global or local) was based on closure or on line orientation. The results
showed that global classification was faster than local classification (i.e., there was a global
advantage) only when the local classification was based on line orientation, not on closure.
Han et al. (1999) used arrows and triangles in the typical global/local task. They found faster
reaction times for global than for local identification and global-to-local interference for
both orientation discrimination and closure discrimination, but the global advantage was
much weaker for the closure discrimination task than for the orientation discrimination task.
Under divided-attention conditions, there was a global advantage for orientation but not for
closure discrimination tasks. Thus, both Kimchi’s and Han et al.’s results indicate that
global or local advantage for many-element hierarchical patterns depends on whether
discrimination at each level involves holistic or basic properties. When local discrimination
involves a configural property like closure, the global advantage markedly decreases or even
disappears relative to the case in which discrimination at that level involves a basic property
like orientation.
These findings converge with others showing a relative perceptual dominance of holistic
properties. They also suggest that holistic properties are not necessarily global or larger.
Using a different approach, Leeuwenberg and van der Helm (1991) also claim that holistic
properties that dominate classification and discrimination of visual forms are not always
global. According to their descriptive minimum principle approach (see Section 6 below),
the specification of dominant properties can be derived from the simplest pattern
representations, and it is the highest hierarchical level in the simplest pattern-representation,
the “superstructure,” that dominates classification and discrimination of visual forms. The
superstructure is not necessarily global or larger.
It is important to notice that there are logical asymmetries in the relations between parts and
wholes, or between components and configurations: Components can exist without a global
configuration, but a configuration cannot exist without components. Therefore, components
are logically prior to the configuration of which they are part. Similarly, if holistic/
configural properties do not reside in the component properties but rather “emerge” from the
interrelations among components, then logic dictates the priority of the components. This
issue has received considerable attention in the old Gestalt literature (e.g., Rausch, 1937).
The point is that the logical structure of a stimulus does not imply one fixed processing
order at all levels of processing (Garner, 1983; Kimchi, 1992; Kimchi & Palmer, 1985). One
possible solution is to assume that non-conscious, bottom-up, stimulus-driven perceptual
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processing proceeds from components to configurations, whereas conscious, top-down, task-
driven attentional processing generally starts with configural properties and then descends to
component properties if required by the task (e.g., Hochstein & Ahissar, 2002).
In sum, the empirical evidence reviewed in these subsections converges towards the idea
that wholes dominate parts in attentional and perceptual processing. As for perceptual
processing, however, this dominance does not imply a specific processing order. In fact, the
central Gestalt idea is that the dominance in perceptual processing is not so much due to a
specific processing order but rather emerges from interactions between stimulus parts
resulting in perceived wholes. As we discuss next, this raises the question of how perceptual
processing might be modeled such that it complies with the empirical evidence.
Interim Evaluation: New Foundations Needed
The conceptual clarifications and operational definitions of key Gestalt notions—such as
holism, emergence, dominance of the whole over the parts, global precedence, and
configural superiority— have been useful in making further theoretical and empirical
progress. For instance, the distinction between global versus local in terms of relative size
and levels of representation in a hierarchical context, and between holistic/configural versus
simple/component properties—the former depending on relations between the latter but not
vice versa—have been important in shedding light on an extensive and muddled literature.
Extending this work significantly, Townsend and colleagues have developed a rigorous
framework for the investigation of holistic perception (e.g., perceptual dependence of parts
on wholes) in terms of information processing, making use of Systems Factorial Technology
(e.g., Fifić & Townsend, 2010; Townsend & Wenger, 2004). Moreover, the distinction
between characteristics of stimulus properties and their representations, on the one hand, and
temporal relationships in their course of processing, has allowed for innovative ideas about
possible neural mechanisms. For instance, Hochstein and Ahissar (2002) have proposed
Reverse Hierarchy Theory, in which they argue that a fast feedforward sweep quickly
activates global percepts (e.g., the overall gist of a scene) in high-level areas with large
receptive fields, whereas feedback from these higher areas to lower areas and recurrent
processing in the low-level areas with small receptive fields is necessary for fine-grained
processing of local details. Hence, this theory distinguishes the anatomical, structural
aspects of the hierarchy of the visual system (low- versus high-level representations) from
the temporal, functional aspects of it (early versus late stages of processing). In this context,
it is not unusual to find that some Gestalts might emerge gradually along the visual system’s
hierarchy, for instance, configural superiority effects being reflected in neural activity in
early retinotopic regions (Alexander & van Leeuwen, 2010), as well as high-level object
areas (Kubilius, Wagemans, & Op de Beeck, 2011; Liu, Plomp, van Leeuwen, & Ioannides,
2006), whereas other Gestalts seem to be encoded in low-level areas based on feedback from
higher-order regions (e.g., Kourtzi, Tolias, Altmann, Augath, & Logothetis, 2003; Murray,
Boyaci, & Kersten, 2006).
Despite this progress on the conceptual and empirical front, we are still in need of stronger
theoretical frameworks to provide solid foundations to the Gestalt approach’s major
principles. Gestalt psychology led to a proliferation of hundreds of “laws” (or, more
accurately, “principles”) of perceptual organization, such as grouping by proximity,
similarity, and good continuation. Thus, concerns arose that there were more explanations
being proposed than the number of phenomena they could explain. Could these highly
specific principles be reduced to just one or two? Two such general explanations emerged:
Prägnanz (also known as the simplicity or the minimum principle), which holds that
perceptions are structured into the simplest organizations possible, and the likelihood
principle, which holds that percepts are structured to conform to the most likely stimulus
that could have given rise to the sensory information registered on the retina (Pomerantz &
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Kubovy, 1986). Consider Necker’s (1832) well-known wire-frame image of a cube, its
parallel edges drawn as twelve parallel lines of the same length allowing for two alternative
in-depth interpretations. Do we see it as a cube because doing so simplifies the percept or
because a cube is the most likely distal stimulus consistent the retinal image resulting from
this stimulus? Similarly, do we perceive the trapezoidal Ames window as rectangular
because this is simpler or because it is more likely?
The simplicity principle is most closely associated with the Gestalt school. The core idea
was that percepts are organized automatically into simple, global structures, perhaps through
processes analogous to physical mechanisms at work with magnetic fields and soap bubbles.
In the absence of complicating factors such as wind or acceleration, a soap bubble will shape
itself into a sphere, which is the simplest of all 3-D shapes in that it is fully described by one
parameter (its diameter). Correspondingly, the 12 line segments constituting the Necker
cube pattern are seen as a cube because a cube has only one parameter (edge length). In
doing so, all its edge lengths become the same and all angles become 90°. The likelihood
principle is most closely associated with von Helmholtz (see also Rock, 1983). It holds that
the perceptual system determines the most likely distal stimulus that could have given rise to
the proximal stimulus (the retinal image). It holds that we see the 12 line segments as a cube
because historically (in either phylogenetic or ontogenetic terms) a cube has been the most
frequent distal stimulus consistent with the proximal stimulus of the Necker cube image.
Distinguishing between the simplicity and likelihood principles has proven challenging
because of difficulty unconfounding the simplicity and the likelihood of test stimuli.
Controlled rearing studies might answer this question but they are not feasible. Kanizsa
(1979) created demonstrations arguing forcefully against simplicity but there is a
complication here too: Simplicity usually only refers to the perceived objects as such,
whereas his demonstrations also required the inclusion of positional complexity in terms of
coincidence avoidance (see Rock, 1983 and below, particularly Figure 8).
From a functional, evolutionary viewpoint, the likelihood principle would be more appealing
because the veridicality of perception is a primary factor in determining natural selection:
An organism is less likely to survive and reproduce if its perception of the physical
environment is erroneous in important respects. A potentially serious problem for the
likelihood framework, however, is that the organism does not actually have access to
veridical properties of the physical world, but only to its imperfect sensory information
about them (i.e., the “brain-in-a-vat” argument). How can the organism compute likelihoods
of external circumstances without knowing their prior probabilities? The simplicity
hypothesis suggests an answer: Perhaps evolution has built into the organism’s perceptual
system a surrogate for likelihood via simplicity, which is internally accessible (Palmer,
2003). Mach (1906/1959) and Attneave (1982), therefore, suggested that both principles
may be two sides of the same coin.
In the next four sections, we review recent progress regarding simplicity and likelihood,
extending these principles far beyond the sterile conflict between the Gestaltists and the
Helmholtzians. First, we show how the intuitive notion of Prägnanz or simplicity can be
further substantiated in terms of the intrinsic dynamics of the brain as a self-organizing,
adaptive system. Then, in three consecutive sections, we will discuss how simplicity and
likelihood may be connected in a deep and meaningful way, in views derived from (1)
measurement principles in a system of sensors, (2) a Bayesian approach, and (3) Structural
Information Theory.
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A Dynamical Systems Approach
Introduction
As noted above, traditional Gestalt psychology envisaged the many laws of perceptual
organization to be manifestations of a common principle: the law of Prägnanz. Persistently,
they sought to elucidate this principle by relying on metaphors involving static equilibria of
field forces. But equilibrium field forces are inert; they change only when external
conditions change. At the same time, Gestaltists emphasized the active, spontaneous
character of perceptual organization. The tension between inert and active aspects of
perception constitutes a puzzle that is pervasive beyond Gestalt psychology, and has
persisted to date. Here, we discuss how more recent developments in nonlinear dynamical
systems theory may eventually resolve this conundrum.
Dynamical systems theory describes equilibria in terms of attractors (e.g., Hopfield, 1982).
The strength of attractors could be equated with a measure of Prägnanz (van Leeuwen,
1990). Attractors are a desirable concept for perception, as they offer robustness against
variation in stimulation. For instance, Luccio (1999, p. 91, our italics) writes: “The principle
of organization acts as precise laws to which the process is forced to obey, overall in the
sense of maximum economy and simplicity. Its result is a perfect balance of the forces at
play and thus has also a maximum of stability and resistance to change.” However, this
comment emphasizes only the inert aspect of dynamics.
Resistance to change may not adequately characterize the visual system. Consider the two
alternative in-depth interpretations of the Necker cube. Prolonged exposure typically leads
to switching between these interpretations (e.g., Attneave, 1971; Einhäuser, Martin, &
König, 2004; Nakatani & van Leeuwen, 2005, 2006; Peterson & Gibson, 1991; van Dam &
van Ee, 2006; for a review, see Long & Toppino, 2004). To a large extent, this behavior is
involuntary. We can try to deliberately hold on to an orientation; this will reduce the overall
switching rate, but does not stop our perception from switching (Strüber & Stadler, 1999;
Toppino, 2003). Interference with the organism’s activity, such as focusing attention on a
biased region (Peterson & Gibson, 1991; Toppino, 2003) or eliminating eye-movements by
retinally stabilizing the image (Pritchard, 1958) cannot prevent it either. Switching occurs
even in the afterimage, when the stimulus has been removed (McDougall, 1903). Perceptual
switching, therefore, is illustrative of an intrinsic tendency to actively move on from
established interpretations (Leopold & Logothetis, 1999). We must conclude that there are
mechanisms within the visual system that provide a degree of flexibility. These mechanisms
involve spontaneous activity that offset the resistance to change, which is a by-product of
the system’s robustness.
Noise-Driven Models
A classical Gaussian noise component added to its activity can drive the system out of an
otherwise stable attractor. An accumulation of noise events can drive it sufficiently far away
to enable a transition to another one. Consider a system with two roughly equivalent
attractors (a “double-well” model). Let these correspond to two alternative interpretations of
an ambiguous figure. Noise could be effectuating the switching back and forth between
them. The concept of an internal noise source has gained wide acceptance in the study of
sensory processes due to signal detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966). Empirical evidence
suggesting that noise is responsible for perceptual switching is found in the observed
distributions of dwell times (Levelt, 1967). These are the durations with which a certain
interpretation is maintained. Dwell times are believed to follow a positively skewed
distribution called Gamma distribution (Borsellino, Marco, Allazetta, Rinesi, & Bartolini,
1972). These distributions are characterized by a parameter that can take real values. In
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dwell-time distributions, however, it typically takes whole values, consistent with models in
which switching depends on a whole number of independent chance events (Taylor &
Aldridge, 1974). Although these models produce the right kind of distribution, other models,
including ones that have no stochastic noise component whatsoever, can produce such a
distribution just as well (van Leeuwen, Steyvers, & Nooter, 1997). Moreover, noise-based
models predict zero correlation between subsequent dwell times. In fact, the correlations are
consistently above zero and decrease with lag (Bassingthwaighte, Liebovitch, & West, 1994;
van Ee, 2009). Such sequential dependencies suggest that dynamics is contributing to the
behavior.
As an alternative, therefore, we might consider systems far from equilibrium (Maturana &
Varela, 1980), in which a small perturbation may have large consequences over time (“the
butterfly effect”). Such systems would show the observed patterns of correlation but they
would clash with the desirability of stable, robust perceptual representations. We can solve
this problem if we consider systems that cycle between approach and avoidance of
equilibria; in other words between being governed by stability and flexibility. In olfactory
perception, Skarda and Freeman (1987) have described transitions between stability and
flexibility as coordinated with the breathing cycle; upon inhalation the system is geared
towards attracting states, and thereby responsive to incoming odor; upon exhalation the
attractors are annihilated for the system to be optimally sensitive to new information.
Freeman and van Dijk (1987) envisaged a similar system for visual perception; we might
consider a system becoming instable, and thus ready to anticipate new information in
preparation for, what was dubbed a “visual sniff” (Freeman, 1991). We may envisage taking
a visual sniff whenever new information is expected, for instance, when moving our eyes to
a new location.
Dynamical Models
Cycles of approach and avoidance of equilibria provide double-well models with an internal,
driving force of change. Suppose that the well in which the system is residing becomes
gradually shallower due to mechanisms such as adaptation or competition. This means that
fewer noise events suffice to drive the system out of its state. This assumption has been
embedded into macroscopic models of the dynamics of switching behavior as a phase
transition (Ditzinger & Haken, 1989, 1990). In such models the fast noise and a slow
dynamic cycle work together to produce switching and its characteristic Gamma
distributions.
Köhler and Wallach (1944) proposed this slow mechanism to be neural fatigue or satiation.
There is no direct evidence of neural fatigue of active configurations, as Köhler (1940)
envisaged it. There is, of course, the well-established phenomenon of neural adaptation—the
reduced neural response to prolonged or repeated stimulation, for instance, to light
intensities in the retina of the rat (Dowling, 1963) or to patterned stimuli in the retina (for a
review, see Graham, 1989) or in the ventral visual system responsible for human form
perception (Noguchi, Inui, & Kakigi, 2004). However, neural adaptation takes place at the
local level of ion currents conductivity in the membrane of the neuron (Sanchez-Vives,
Nowak, & McCormick, 2000), and is therefore unable to provide selectivity in adaptation at
the level of global perceptual patterns (Barlow & Földiák, 1989). According to these
authors, adaptation to patterns occurs through a mechanism of anti-Hebbian decoupling
between cells that are simultaneously active; this generally serves to make neural population
codes sparser with extended presentation. It might thus be supposed that there is a
continuous sparsification in population activity selective to patterns.
This slow mechanism could be useful to explain the steady, continuous increase in switching
rate with prolonged presentation of a stimulus. Correlations between subsequent dwell times
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could be explained by fluctuations in adaptation rate (van Ee, 2009). Kim, Grabowecky, and
Suzuki (2006) induced stochastic resonance in switching by periodically alternating the
stimulus, thereby demonstrating the presence of macroscopic noise in the system. This
means there are at least two switching mechanisms possible according to the double-well
model: one is high-frequency, microscopic noise in sensory channels and the other is
macroscopic noise in adaptation rates.
Can we attribute these two mechanisms to brain regions? Functional imaging (fMRI) reveals
that switching is accompanied by activation in ventral occipital and intraparietal higher-
order visual areas, deactivation in primary visual cortex and the pulvinar (Kleinschmidt,
Büchel, Zeki, & Frackowiak, 1998). Electrocortical activity recording (EEG) shows
transient synchronizations of activity between frontal and parietal areas, sometimes
accompanied by occipital activity (Nakatani & van Leeuwen, 2006). On the other hand,
suppression of frontal activity using Transcranial Magnetic Stimulation (TMS) did not
eliminate switching (de Graaf, de Jong, Goebel, van Ee, & Sack, 2011). This leaves us with
occipital areas as the (noise) source of switching and parietal areas as the putative locus of
adaptation, responsible for sequential dependencies in switching.
Still, in these models, robustness and flexibility remain opposing regimes. Is it possible for a
system to be robust at one time and flexible at another without having to cycle through a
macroscopic loop? Consider the property called meta-stability as illustrated in Figure 3
(loosely based on Kelso et al., 1995), which shows a return plot of a system. On the X-axis
the state of the system is specified by the value of a single variable x at time t (xt). The
system evolves in time, according to a function F, the red curve. Follow the arrows to see
how the system evolves over time. For simplicity, the system depicted here evolves in
discrete time, such that xt+1 = F(xt). The Y-axis plots xt+1 against xt. The green line specifies
the values where xt = xt+1. Would the system reach the green line, all changes would come
to a halt. However, for the current F it will never reach such states. There are two intervals
of x, <A> and <B>, where the red line almost touches the green line. Here, changes to
system state x are minimal. Thus, it can dwell in the neighborhood of A or B for a certain
time interval. When approaching these states, the system is apparently stable. The system
will get caught in one of these states, and free itself only to get caught after a while in the
other one. In this manner, the system continues to swing back and forth between A and B.
This simple model would perform perceptual switching, for instance, if the apparent stability
in approaching A or B corresponds to reaching an alternative orientation of the Necker cube.
Were F actually to touch the green line in A and B, the system approaching A or B would
actually stay there. This is where noise would come back into the picture. Small fluctuations
could move the system beyond these points, such that x is allowed to roam until it eventually
gets caught again. The difference with Figure 3 is that small-scale fluctuation, rather than
fine tuning of the function to obtain a gap with the green line is responsible for corrupting
the attractor. The difference is moot. In both cases, we are dealing with a corrupted fragile
attractor—that is, an attractor with a built-in escape route. Corrupted fragile attractors thus
have built-in flexibility.
Dynamic Synchronization and Complex Adaptive Systems
Fragile attractor models of switching are generically in accordance with the empirical
distributions of dwell times, and their dynamical character leads readily to the prediction of
nonzero serial correlations in the dwell times (Fürstenau, 2010; van Leeuwen et al., 1997).
To distinguish the two, we should look at long-range dependencies between dwell times
(Wagenmakers, Grünwald, & Steyvers, 2006). Consider a series of dwell times: Clearly they
fluctuate irregularly from one time to the next. With long-range dependency, non-
overlapping running means of these data fluctuate in a similarly irregular manner (Beran,
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1992; Mandelbrot & Wallis, 1969). Because of these similarities across scales, these data are
said to have fractal characteristics. Recently, Gao et al. (2006) presented experimental
evidence for the fractal nature of dwell times in the Necker cube. This suggests that
switching is best considered as a process governed by fragile attractors. These naturally
occur in complex adaptive systems consisting of coupled oscillators. As the number of
oscillators grows large, corrupted fragile attractors increasingly become predominant in their
dynamics, due to a phenomenon called attractor crowding (Tsang & Wiesenfeld, 1990;
Wiesenfeld & Hadley, 1989). This may be nature’s solution to the problem of how to
combine flexibility and robustness in a perceptual system.
This perspective was embodied in an early model of perceptual organization, in which
metastability along the lines of Figure 3 of the system’s synchronized activity is responsible
for switching in ambiguous figures (van Leeuwen et al., 1997). The model consists of
several layers of nonlinear neural mass oscillators. Ongoing activity in this model
synchronizes and breaks down spontaneously; the patterns of synchronization are modulated
by stimulation. For ambiguous stimuli, the system shows two alternative patterns of
synchrony, and switches rapidly between them. This model was never tuned to empirical
data and lacks a plausible large-scale neural architecture. Despite these shortcomings, the
model may still have some theoretical value to date as an early application of complex
adaptive systems in psychology. More recent applications of the model have addressed the
self-organization of modular, connected networks in functional architecture (Gong & van
Leeuwen, 2003; Rubinov, Sporns, van Leeuwen, & Breakspear, 2009). Further along these
lines, the more recent model by Fürstenau (2010) has a layered structure that takes into
account the global architecture of the thalamo-cortical loop, and it accommodates the fractal
nature of dwell times in accordance with Gao et al.’s (2006) observations.
Complex adaptive systems show long-term dependencies, because their behavior exhibits
self-organized criticality. Self-organized criticality has been observed in the spontaneous
synchronization and desynchronization of EEG activity (Gong, Nikolaev, & van Leeuwen,
2007). Long-term dependencies are found in a large variety of tasks, such as mental rotation,
lexical decision, speeded visual search, estimation of distance, estimation of rotation,
estimation of force, estimation of time, simple reaction time, and word naming (Gilden,
1997, 2001; Gilden, Thornton, & Mallon, 1995; Van Orden, Holden, & Turvey, 2003), as
well as in recordings of human EEG (Ito, Nikolaev, & van Leeuwen, 2007). It seems,
therefore, that a dynamic characterization is appropriate for a much wider range of behaviors
other than switching. This underlines the general relevance of dynamic models for
psychology and the illustrative value of switching for understanding perception and
cognition.
Complex adaptive systems imply a new perspective on the “perceptual sniff.” Generally,
more stable and instable periods like in Figure 3 (Ito et al., 2007) alternate in the brain.
Unstable periods are characterized by transient patterns of synchrony in short-range, high
frequency activity. According to an influential point of view, this is when collective
representations are bound together through synchronization of oscillatory activity (Milner,
1974; von der Malsburg, 1981). Binding-related neural oscillations have been observed in
the gamma range (roughly 40–70 Hz) within as well as between local brain regions
(Eckhorn et al., 1988; Gray, König, Engel, & Singer, 1989; Singer & Gray, 1995). It is
possible that these episodes do not necessarily reflect binding, but rather the breakdown of
global stability of interpretation in a stage in which the system is exploring competing new
representations. Accordingly, brief episodes of synchronous activity in the gamma band
occur prior to perceptual switching (Nakatani & van Leeuwen, 2006).
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The more stable periods show oscillatory activity in lower frequency ranges, specifically in
the beta range of EEG (Nikolaev, Gepshtein, Gong, & van Leeuwen, 2010). Gamma and
beta activities are generally believed to have complimentary functions (Donner & Siegel,
2011). Intervals of beta synchronization, called coherence intervals (van Leeuwen, 2007),
last longer when evoked by less ambiguous stimuli than by more ambiguous ones (Nikolaev
et al., 2010). The less ambiguous the stimulus, the more information contained in it. Thus,
coherence intervals reflect broadcasting of information across brain areas (van Leeuwen et
al., 1997; van Leeuwen & Raffone, 2001). In such a perspective, our brain activity patterns
reflect competition between representations, as well as the resolution of the competition,
followed by global broadcasting; this qualifies as the mechanism by which our visual system
proceeds autonomously from one experience to the next (van Leeuwen, 2007).
Conclusion
A dynamical systems approach can explain how the brain’s capacities for self-organization
are ideally suited to balance robustness and flexibility. Combining both is essential for
perception to be tuned to stimuli impinging from the environment, without being overloaded
by them, with just enough variation in perceptual states to lead to proper cognitive
interpretations and functional actions. Different sources of change (stochastic and
deterministic), different types of noise (microscopic and macroscopic), and different kinds
of attractors and dynamics were considered. Moreover, some of these were shown to
correlate well with known behavioral effects (e.g., dwell times) and recently discovered
specific neural signatures (e.g., coherence intervals and self-organized criticality of
synchronization of neural oscillations). Although the review above was aimed at
understanding the dynamics of perceptual switching, the theoretical concepts and neural
aspects discussed in this context, characterizing the brain as a complex adaptive system, may
readily be extended to deal with other aspects of Gestalt formation such as perceptual
grouping and object formation (e.g., Hock, Kelso, & Schöner, 1993; Hock & Nichols, 2012;
Hock, Schöner, & Giese, 2003).
Hence, there are clearly modern counterparts to Köhler’s notion of Prägnanz and self-
organization, which are also empirically fruitful. In addition, as alluded to before, there also
modern counterparts to Helmholtz’s notion of likelihood and unconscious inference (e.g.,
the Bayesian approach to perception) and contemporary syntheses of simplicity and
likelihood, which also have a strong empirical basis. We discuss these in the next three
sections.
Principles of Measurement in a System of Sensors
Introduction
The Berlin school of Gestalt psychology tended to emphasize properties of the system above
properties of system elements. They assumed a one-way global-to-local determination, on
which properties of elements could be understood only by knowing their places within the
system. We will now consider a modern view of the determination of systems and their
elements in service of visual perception. On the modern view, the determination is two-way:
Properties of the system can be traced from properties of elements, and also properties of
elements depend on their places in the system.
Elementary versus system processes—Key developments in the sensory physiology
of the twentieth century had a strong flavor of sensory atomism. Properties of individual
sensory neurons came to the fore (Barlow, 1972; Parker & Newsome, 1998), as painstaking
studies revealed a great variety and complexity of their receptive fields (Hartline, 1940;
Hubel & Wiesel, 1962, 1968; Kuffler, 1953; Maunsell & Newsome, 1987). Indeed, the
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entire visual system was conceived from the perspective of single cell as a hierarchy of
receptive fields of increasing sophistication, from the relatively simple ones, serving “early
vision” (e.g., Adelson & Bergen, 1991), to the more complex, serving “mid-level vision”
(e.g., perceptual organization; Nakayama, 1999) and “high-level vision” (e.g., object
recognition; Gross & Mishkin, 1977; Ullman, 1996). Yet, as methods of neuronal recording
matured and basic facts about neural activity were settled, it became increasingly clear that a
theory that rested on single cells alone was incomplete (see also Spillmann, 1999). Anti-
atomist tendencies started to emerge toward the end of last century, often appealing to
Gestalt legacy (e.g., Albright, 1994; Albright & Stoner, 2002; Allman, Miezin, &
McGuinness, 1985; Gilbert, Ts’o, & Wiesel, 1991; Zhou, Friedman, & von der Heydt,
2000). It is important to note, however, that the resurgent anti-atomism of modern
neuroscience is synthetic. It rests on the growing understanding of how the function of
individual neuronal cells is modulated by these cells’ neuronal context, and how the
neuronal effects of stimulation are modulated by stimulus context. In other words, the
(atom-like) single cells are studied as integral parts of a (holistic) system. The theory
developed below is a manifestation of the same synthetic tendency.
Just as sensory physiology, mainstream behavioral studies of perception were dominated by
atomist tendencies for much of the century. Elementary sensory processes, such as detection
and discrimination of simple stimuli, were emphasized and often viewed as the sole
foundation of sensory science. The increasing rigor of this work was helped by
mathematical ideas imported from the theory of linear systems, the theory of
communication, and probability theory. At first, these advances appeared foreign to the anti-
atomist Gestalt ideology. In particular, the linear-system approach to sensory processes is
only tenable when stimulus components exert their effects independently of one another, in
stark contrast to the Gestalt view of perception. And yet, the increasingly rigorous inquiry
into elementary sensory processes created a foundation from which new perspectives opened
up on how the tension between atomistic and holistic views of perception may be reconciled
without suppressing either side. The theoretical outlook presented below rests on a dualistic
view of sensory measurement, whose formal manifestation is Gabor’s uncertainty principle.
As we will see, the dualistic view helps to approach the elementary and system processes
within a unified picture.
Intrinsic versus extrinsic processes—The Berlin school of Gestalt psychology
focused almost exclusively on processes intrinsic to the perceiving organism. Effects of
environmental changes, such as visual after-effects, were studied to advance understanding
of the intrinsic processes (e.g., Köhler & Wallach, 1944). The environment itself did not
interest the Berlin Gestaltists beyond the phenomenological analysis of the perceived
(“behavioral”) environment, in contrast to the “geographic” environment—the source of
stimulation (Koffka, 1935). It was the Graz school of Gestalt psychology that addressed the
question about structure of geographical environment. Fritz Heider, a philosophically-
minded offspring of the Graz school, dedicated his early work to the environmental causes
of perception (Heider, 1926, 1959). Heider concentrated on the part-whole structure of the
chain of physical events that lead to perception, anticipating and influencing the ecological
thread in perceptual science advanced by Brunswik (1955) and Gibson (1979). Egon
Brunswik, in particular, is credited with the first studies of how perceptual organization
depended on regularities of the physical environment (Brunswik & Kamiya, 1953), a theme
that flourishes today (see Anonymous Author List, 2012, Section 4).
Modern studies of Gestalt phenomena that emphasize statistical regularities of the
environment tend to lean on these regularities at the expense of other factors. The
environmental bias makes perceptual theory as incomplete as a theory that ignores
environmental structure. The framework presented below embraces both the “internal” and
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“external” aspects of perception. This unity is attained by taking an economic perspective.
Sensory measurements are ranked by their utility, which depends both on capacities of
individual sensors (intrinsic to sensory systems) and on how useful the sensors are in the
current environment (extrinsic to the system). To explain this modern synthetic view, we
first need to introduce recent results from studies of apparent motion.
Unity of apparent motion
An elementary case of apparent motion is illustrated in Figure 4. Two lights (represented in
panel A by the unfilled circles) are flashed one after another at different spatial locations s1
and s2, at instants t1 and t2, respectively. Motion is seen only for some spatial and temporal
distances between the lights. The “quality” (or “strength”) of apparent motion depends on
the combined effect of spatial and temporal distances between the lights (as shown in the
distance graph of panel B). Two regimes of apparent motion can be distinguished. In the
regime of space-time coupling (panel C), the strength of motion is conserved by increasing
both spatial and temporal distances between the lights (Korte, 1915; Koffka, 1935). In the
regime of space-time tradeoff (panel D), the strength is conserved by opposite changes of
spatial and temporal distances: increasing one distance must be accompanied by decreasing
the other distance (Burt & Sperling, 1981).
Later work showed that the two regimes of apparent motion are special cases of a general
pattern. Gepshtein and Kubovy (2007) found that the regime of tradeoff holds at low speeds
of apparent motion, and the regime of coupling at high speeds, with one regime changing
smoothly into another as a function of speed. The authors derived “equivalence contours” of
apparent motion, which were consistent with the shapes of isosensitivity contours measured
at the threshold of visibility (Kelly, 1979; reviewed in Nakayama, 1985). Figure 5 illustrates
this idea using a contour plot of spatiotemporal contrast sensitivity. Each contour represents
an isosensitivity set of stimulus conditions, at which the same amount of luminance contrast
makes the stimuli just visible. The conditions marked by warm colors require less contrast to
reach the threshold of visibility than the conditions marked by cool colors. If conditions of
isosensitivity were similar to conditions of equivalently strong apparent motion, the different
regimes of apparent motion were expected in different parts of distance graph, indicated in
Figure 5 by the two pairs of connected circles (as in Figure 4C-D). Results of Gepshtein and
Kubovy (2007) were consistent with this prediction. A monotonic relationship held between
the isosensitivity contours and the equivalence conditions of apparent motion, indicating that
the perception of motion is controlled by similar factors at the threshold of visibility and
above the threshold. The fact that regimes of apparent motion occur where they are expected
from the threshold measurements indicates that common principles govern perception in
both cases.
These results undermine the accepted view of perceptual grouping. They indicate that
human vision favors sometimes short and sometimes long spatiotemporal distances, which is
inconsistent with the proximity principle (Gepshtein, Tyukin, & Kubovy, 2007), a
cornerstone of Wertheimer’s (1923) conception of perceptual organization. In other words,
the proximity principle does not generalize to dynamic scenes. There is no spatiotemporal
proximity principle. Elements of a dynamic display separated by short spatiotemporal
distances are not more likely to be perceived as parts of the same object than elements
separated by longer spatiotemporal distances. The traditional view needs revision. One
direction for such a revision is a theory from principles more general than the empirically
observed tendencies. In the following sections, we review such a theory, which explains
how the unity of experimental findings about apparent motion, on the one hand, and
consistency of these results with results on spatiotemporal sensitivity, on the other, are
expected from basic properties of measurement.
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Principles of Measurement
Gabor (1946) formalized a fundamental result in the theory of communication that had been
increasingly appreciated by engineers early in the twentieth century (Hartley, 1928; Gabor,
1952). It is the uncertainty principle of measurement. The principle applies to simultaneous
measurements of two aspects of any signal: its location and content. At the performance
limit of any measuring device, the precision of measuring the location is constrained by the
precision of measuring the content, and vice versa. We briefly review this principle in one
dimension (Figure 6), before we turn to its consequences for measurement of motion:
• To measure signal location on dimension x is to determine interval Δx that contains
the signal. The smaller the interval, the higher the precision (the lower the
uncertainty) of measurement.
• To measure signal content on x is to determine how the signals varies over x, i.e.,
to measure signal variation. The variation is evaluated by decomposing a signal to
its elementary variations: harmonic functions of different frequencies. Because the
elementary variations are each characterized by a single frequency, the result of this
measurement is called the frequency content of the signal (fx in Figure 6A).
• Measuring signal location and frequency content at the same time presents a
challenge. Measurement of location is most precise (least uncertain) when the
signal is contained in a very small interval but small intervals cannot capture
information sufficient for identifying the (frequency) content of signals precisely.
Measurement of signal content is precise on large intervals. In effect, there is a
tradeoff in precision of measuring signal location and content.
Gabor gave this tradeoff a formal expression—his uncertainty principle—as follows. At the
limit of precision of any measuring device, the uncertainties associated with measuring
signal location and frequency content are related. Gabor represented the joined
measurements using information cells (“logons”) in (x, f), shown as rectangles in Figure 6.
He proposed that the number of information cells that contain a representation of signal in
(x, f) is a measure of the information contained in a signal. Spatial precision of this device
can only be increased by decreasing precision of measuring frequency content, and vice
versa. To precisely measure both the location and content of a stimulus, visual systems
might employ specialized sensors, tuned to x or f. But biological systems are likely to prefer
a compromise to the utter specialization, for two reasons. First, both location and content of
a signal often need to be measured by the same sensor at the same time, to avoid the
problem of matching content to location. Second, biological systems have limited resources.
An economical design, in which the same resource (the same sensory neuron or neuronal
circuit) performs several functions, has an advantage. According to these considerations, the
sensors represented by the information cell in the middle of Figure 6A must be preferred
over the specialized sensors. A measuring device that implements this compromise
optimally is a Gabor filter.
Physiological studies of visual perception have shown that visual cortical neurons are
optimized for measuring the location and frequency content of the stimulus in a manner
consistent with Gabor’s filter (Daugman, 1985; Glezer, Gauzelman, & Yakovlev, 1986;
Kulikowski, Marcelja, & Bishop, 1982; MacKay, 1981; Marcelja, 1980). The similarity of
visual receptive fields and Gabor filters is well established (Jones & Palmer, 1987). Also
well established is the interpretation of this similarity, that the particular weighting functions
facilitate the joint measurements of the locations and contents of stimuli.
In the following, we review several consequences of the uncertainty principle beyond
individual sensors. In particular, we show how the extension of this approach to a system of
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sensors helps to reveal a unity of results from the statistical and phenomenological traditions
in perceptual science.
Systems of Sensors
To understand effects of Gabor’s uncertainty principle for perception of motion, we must
study interactions of four uncertainties: two spatial and two temporal, represented by the
spatial and temporal logons on the side panels of Figure 7A. Next, we make the same step as
in Figure 6B: We combine all uncertainties to a single function in Figure 7B:
• First, recall that increasing the interval of measurement in one-dimension has two
effects: increasing uncertainty about signal location and decreasing uncertainty
about signal content, represented by functions B1 and B2 in Figure 7B. The two
effects are summarized by joint uncertainty function B3 (the red curve).
• Now, we use the same approach, first separately, within the spatial and temporal
domains. The spatial and temporal uncertainty functions are represented by the red
curves in Figure 7B.
• Next, we add the spatial and temporal uncertainties for every point in the distance
graph. The result is a spatiotemporal uncertainty function rendered in Figure 7B as
a surface.
The structure of this surface is revealed in a contour plot on the bottom of Figure 7 (a
distance graph). The contours are projections of the level curves of the surface, such that
each contour is an iso-uncertainty set containing (T, S) conditions of the same uncertainty.
These conditions are equally suitable for measuring stimulus location and content in space
and time. The closer a contour to the point of smallest uncertainty (red disk in Figure 7B),
the lower the uncertainty.
Economics of Measurement by a System of Sensors
We have reviewed how properties of individual spatiotemporal measurements vary across
the stimulus space. This analysis allows us to draw several interesting conclusions about
characteristics of motion sensitivity. In particular, it helps to explain why different regimes
of apparent motion are observed using different stimuli, and why the proximity principle
fails in perception of motion.
The distance graph in the bottom of Figure 7 contains iso-uncertainty contours. If
measurement uncertainty was the only force that determined the quality of perceived
motion, all stimuli on an iso-uncertainty set would be perceived equally well. Then, the
different slopes of these contours in different parts of the graph indicate where different
regimes of apparent motion are expected: space-time coupling where the slopes are positive;
space-time tradeoff where the slopes are negative. For example, the regime of coupling is
expected at high speeds, in the top left region of the graph, and the regime of tradeoff is
expected at intermediate speeds, in the top right and bottom left regions.
This way, the empirical inconsistency about combination of spatial and temporal distances
in apparent motion is resolved not only empirically but also theoretically. The different
regimes of apparent motion occur because the expected quality of sensory measurements
varies across the stimulus space. We observe that one of the regimes (coupling) is
inconsistent with the proximity principle, but it is consistent with predictions from the
uncertainty principle, as it is consistent with empirical observations that space-time coupling
holds at some stimulus conditions. This suggests that the uncertainty principle should
replace empirical observations as the foundational fact for perceptual theory.
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To summarize, the inquiry into basic properties of measurement suggested how an
inconsistency in studies of apparent motion can be resolved. This approach has also helped
to understand aspects of perception associated with lower-level perceptual processes.
Gepshtein et al. (2007) pursued the approach summarized in Figure 7 and also considered
the uncertainty associated with relation of the two dimensions of distance graph: speed of
motion. They found that the shapes of iso-uncertainty contours that incorporated speed
uncertainty were similar to the shapes of iso-sensitivity contours plotted in Figure 5. That is,
they showed that basic considerations of sensory measurement can explain more intricate
details of visual sensitivity than the fact that different regimes of apparent motion occur
under different conditions of stimulation.
The predictions of equivalent conditions of sensory measurement serve as a prescription for
optimal allocation of the limited neural resources. The lower the measurement uncertainty,
the more useful these conditions are for the perception of motion. If the visual system
allocated its resources according to this expected utility of measurement, then better sensory
performance (e.g., higher sensitivity) would be expected at conditions where the predicted
uncertainty of measurement is low, and equivalent performance is expected when the
uncertainty is the same.
Using this economic framework, it is easy to see how aspects of sensory measurement
intrinsic to the sensory system relate to its extrinsic aspects—that is, those of the sensory
environment. Evidently, the utility of sensors which are stimulated infrequently is lower
than the utility of sensors stimulated very often. This observation suggests how the intrinsic
utility of sensors ought to be modulated in view of the statistics of stimulation, and how
equivalent conditions of measurement ought to change as the environment changes. The
distribution of motion sensitivity across the entire distance graph is expected to change,
causing increments or decrements of sensitivity in different parts of the stimulus space.
This argument helps to understand why previous studies of adaptation produced puzzling
results. Visual sensitivity was found to sometimes increase and sometimes decrease in
response to exposure to adapting stimulus (e.g., Clifford & Wenderoth, 1999; DeValois,
1977). Such results, obtained in different studies that used stimuli at different parts of our
distance graph, again become special cases of a larger picture, in which adaptation induced a
redistribution of sensitivity across the entire range of stimulation. The question of whether
adaptation should increase or decrease visual sensitivity at an individual point in the distance
graph can only be answered when we know the distribution of sensitivity in the entire
system (Gepshtein, Lesmes, Tyukin, & Albright, 2009).
Conclusion
From this perspective, properties of individual sensors, as well as their contributions to
perception, must depend on the place the sensors occupy in the system. This outlook allows
one to explain phenomena of motion perception that may appear unrelated to one another, or
even contradictory, including the phenomena of apparent motion, spatiotemporal sensitivity,
and motion adaptation. The theory of sensory processes that we outlined, although based on
experimental findings broader than classic Gestalt phenomena, is very much in line with the
Gestalt claim that properties of system elements—the “parts”—are determined by intrinsic
properties of the system—the “whole” (cf. Wertheimer’s “fundamental formula of Gestalt
theory” cited in Section 2). At the same time, however, this synthetic framework allows one
to investigate how extrinsic factors (such as the statistics of natural stimulation) affect visual
sensitivity, helping to resolve the tension between simplicity and likelihood principles in
perceptual science. Two other synthetic frameworks that address this tension are reviewed
next.
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A Bayesian Approach
Introduction
In traditional Gestalt psychology, the foundation of all different phenomena of perceptual
organization lies in the minimum or simplicity principle. A potentially useful alternative
synthesis of many aspects of grouping and object formation is provided by Bayesian theory
and associated computational mechanisms. The Bayesian approach may be viewed as
competing with traditional approaches, but is perhaps better viewed as a comprehensive
mathematical framework in which existing principles are unified and placed on a more
principled foundation.
In Bayesian approaches to perception (Knill & Richards, 1996; Kersten, Mamassian &
Yuille, 2004), all fixation of perceptual belief is assumed to be connected to the calculation
of Bayesian posterior probability. Bayesian inference is a provably rational procedure (see
Cox, 1961; Jaynes, 1957/1988) that results in an optimal combination of the available
evidence with prior beliefs. In perception, generally, this approach entails a rational estimate
of the structure of the scene that combines fit to the available image data with the “mental
set” of the perceiver (background knowledge, context, etc.). In this sense, the Bayesian
approach exemplifies a “principle-based” approach to perception (in contrast to a “bag of
tricks,” Ramachandran, 1985), postulating that one coherent rational procedure underlies a
wide range of perceptual phenomena, ranging from visual illusions (Geisler & Kersten,
2002) to motion (Weiss, Simoncelli, & Adelson, 2002) to shape (Feldman & Singh, 2006).
As applied to perceptual grouping in particular, the Bayesian approach entails the selection
of an optimal organization of the image elements into groups, including contours, surfaces,
whole objects, and entire scenes. In this context the “organization” to be estimated is an
emergent feature or holistic property par excellence. In its reliance on one unifying
principle, namely Bayes’ rule, the goal of Bayesian perceptual grouping is to explain
conventional grouping principles, such as Gestalt rules, as entailments of its central
principle, rather than to assume them as axioms. In this way, the Bayesian approach aims to
reinterpret Gestalt rules as epiphenomena of a more fundamental unifying principle.
The main challenge in formulating Bayesian accounts of perceptual grouping is to develop
appropriate likelihood models for objects (and contours, surfaces, etc.), which can be
thought of as probabilistic generative models of image structure. Bayesian theory does not
directly provide such models, but merely requires that they have the form p(I|Hi) for some
set of candidate models H1…HN, where I is some representation of image data. This
expression quantifies the conditional probability of those particular image data under each
hypothetical organization. The particular form of such likelihood models then becomes the
main focus of inquiry, and may have very different answers in each setting in which it
arises. In many cases the likelihood models adopted implicitly import what amount to
familiar Gestalt preferences. An example is when the generative model for contours (see
below) presumes approximately collinear paths, which seems to smuggle in the Gestalt
conception of good continuation in all but name. Nevertheless, the Bayesian framework
allows such biases to be coherently formalized so that (a) their strength can be quantified,
(b) predictions about what percepts they engender can be substantiated, and (c) rules of
combination can be developed using all the tools of modern statistical theory.
In what follows, (1) we apply the Bayesian approach to grouping principles such as
proximity and good continuation, (2) we offer a Bayesian foundation for core concepts from
Gestalt theory such as object formation and Prägnanz, and (3) we discuss relationships to
other frameworks (simplicity versus likelihood, Minimal Model Theory, and Bayesian
network models).
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A Bayesian Approach to Grouping Principles
Proximity—A simple example is the principle of proximity, which was among the earliest
Gestalt cues to enjoy careful empirical quantification (e.g., Hochberg & Silverstein, 1956;
Oyama, 1961). More recent work by Kubovy, Wagemans and coauthors (Claessens &
Wagemans, 2005; Kubovy & Wagemans, 1995; Kubovy, Holcombe, & Wagemans, 1998;
Kubovy & van den Berg, 2008) has carefully measured the preference for one dot
organization over another as a function of interelement distances, generally finding data
consistent with a Pure Distance law in which grouping strength decays exponentially as a
function of interelement distance (see Anonymous Author List, 2012, Section 3). This
approach (a) explicitly establishes a finite set of alternative organizational hypotheses, and
then (b) weighs probabilistic evidence in favor of one hypothesis over another. Hence,
though not originally formulated in explicitly Bayesian terms, this finding sets the stage for
a Bayesian interpretation mechanism, involving a generative model of dot clusters as foci
from which visual elements are generated with probability monotonically decreasing with
distance from their centers (Claessens & Wagemans, 2008).
Good continuation—Another example is collinearity, which Wertheimer (1923)
identified as a Gestalt organizing principle under the admittedly vague phrase “good
continuation” (“durchgehende Gerade” or “continuing direction”). In a Bayesian context, the
expectation that contours tend to continue approximately straight can be realized as a
likelihood model assigning probabilities to specific magnitudes of deviation from perfect
collinearity (Feldman, 1996, 1997a; Feldman & Singh, 2005; Singh & Fulvio, 2005, 2007).
This likelihood distribution can take several forms, such as a Gaussian (normal) distribution
centered at collinear, or a von Mises distribution, which is both more mathematically
appropriate (Fisher, 1993) and is supported by neurophysiological data (Swindale, 1998).
Whatever the choice, the nature of the likelihood distribution constitutes the system’s tacit
assumptions about exactly how “smooth” contours are likely to behave in the environment.
The connection between the statistical structure of contours and the empirical statistics of
naturally occurring object boundaries has been made more explicit by Elder and Goldberg
(2002) and by Geisler, Perry, Super, and Gallogly (2001). In this connection, the Bayesian
approach to perceptual organization can be regarded as sharing an essential premise with an
older tradition of justifying perceptual biases via arguments from “ecological validity”
(Brunswik & Kamiya, 1953), in that both connect perceptual principles to statistical
regularities of the world. More broadly, likelihood models can be developed that are tuned
to the characteristics of specific natural object categories (see Wilder, Feldman & Singh,
2011). But again, placing this argument in a Bayesian framework enormously clarifies the
mathematical substance of this connection, showing exactly in what sense, and under what
assumptions, perceptual hypotheses are justified by assumptions about the world.
A Bayesian Foundation for Core Concepts from Gestalt Theory
Object formation—Perceptual grouping is sometimes described as the formation of
objects or units from the initially disparate element of the visual array—that is, groups large
enough to be considered “whole.” Like many aspects of the conventional Gestalt account,
this somewhat vague idea can be given a more precise meaning in a Bayesian framework
(Feldman, 2007). By its nature, Bayesian theory presumes data-generating stochastic
models, here meaning object models whose boundaries and surface properties are generated
in a well-defined way that involves a well-defined random component. Such a generative
model can (and in complex situations usually does) contain multiple distinct data sources—
that is, sources that are generated independently but whose outputs combine to form the
ultimate image configuration. A simple example is a mixture model, a probability
distribution that is formed from the combination of some number of distinct sources each
with its own mean and variance (McLachlan & Basford, 1988). Estimation of mixture
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models is a statistically challenging problem, because of the need to estimate the correct
separation of the data into its component sources—that is, to estimate which component was
actually responsible for generating each datum. The problem of perceptual organization can
be thought of as a particularly complex mixture estimation problem, in which the distinct
sources not only have distinct means and variances but also distinct geometric properties,
surface properties, colors, textures, and so forth. In this view the “objects” are the distinct
generative sources, but estimating them correctly—solving the perceptual organization
problem—is beyond the capacity of contemporary theory.
Prägnanz—Perhaps the most subtle connection between Gestalt and Bayesian approaches
to perceptual grouping arises in connection with the term Prägnanz, used to encompass a
wide range of Gestalt organizational preferences involving harmony, coherence, or
simplicity (Kanizsa, 1979; Koffka, 1935; Metzger, 1953). In a Bayesian framework, this
admittedly vague and disjunctive term corresponds to the single unifying principle: Bayes’
rule. Given appropriate generative models (i.e., assuming that the image configuration was
generated stochastically by a model within the assumed model class), the maximum
posterior interpretation is, in fact, the optimal interpretation. In particular, it has often been
noted that Bayesian models tend to incorporate a preference for simpler interpretations
(sometimes referred to as “Bayes’ Occam”), essentially because larger families of
hypotheses (involving more parameters, and in this sense inherently more complex) must
assign a lower prior probability to each individual hypothesis (Jeffreys, 1961; MacKay,
2003; Tenenbaum & Griffiths, 2001). This observation is part of a larger fabric of
connections between simplicity and probability that has been developed in the statistical
learning literature, including the principle of Minimum Description Length (Rissanen,
1978), which connects the maximization of the Bayesian posterior to the minimization of the
data encoding, and the theory of Kolmogorov complexity (see Li & Vitányi, 1997), which
connects the inherent complexity of models to their probability via a “universal prior”
(Solomonoff, 1964a and b). This theme is taken up again below.
Relationships to Other Frameworks
Simplicity versus likelihood—In a Bayesian framework, the central unifying principle
of Gestalt theory—Prägnanz—may be identified with the central unifying principle of
Bayesian theory—maximization of the Bayesian posterior. The question then is where a
Bayesian visual system might get its prior and conditional probabilities from, so to speak.
According to the likelihood principle, these probabilities relate to frequencies of occurrence
in the world; and according to the simplicity principle, they are derived from the simplest
stimulus descriptions (i.e., simpler is more likely). Chater (1996) and Feldman (2009)
argued that these stances can be reconciled (but see also below). In any case, a Bayesian
visual system using simplicity-based probabilities would be in line not only with Bayes’
Occam but also with the intuitive “workshop” metaphor of Adelson and Pentland (1996),
who analogized scene interpretation to the construction of a physical model in which total
costs (fees to carpenters, painters, and lighting designers) are minimized. Maximizing the
posterior minimizes these costs, thus yielding the most economical solution—as long as the
costs have been correctly calibrated, i.e., as long as the assumptions underlying the
generative model are correct.
Minimal Model Theory—The Bayesian preference for simpler perceptual interpretations
over more complex ones defines an implicit qualitative ordering of interpretations in the
model space (Feldman, 2009), which can be made explicit in a lattice or other partial order
(Feldman, 1997b, 2003a; Jepson & Mann, 1999; Jepson & Richards, 1992; Richards, Jepson
& Feldman, 1996). This point of view suggests a “logical” rendition of Bayesian perceptual
interpretation, in which Bayes’ rule is replaced by a logical operation that selects an
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extremal interpretation from a structured space of qualitative alternatives. This framework is
sometimes termed Minimal Model Theory because it entails the selection of a logically
minimal model from this partially ordered set. This framework relates closely to Rock’s
(1983) avoidance-of-coincidence principle. This principle holds that interpretations should
be preferred in which as few image properties as possible are “coincidences,” such as
accidents of viewpoint or configuration. By this argument, reliable scene representations
should be built upon properties that are unlikely to be accidental consequences of viewpoint,
sometimes called non-accidental properties (Witkin & Tenenbaum, 1983; see also below for
a different model along the same lines). An example is collinearity, which is unlikely to
arise “accidentally” in the image unless it actually occurs in the 3-D scene. Minimal model
theory orders interpretations by subset inclusion over the set of accidental configurations.
The interpretation that is minimal in this order, among all interpretations consistent with the
image, is thus the interpretation that leaves the fewest coincidences unexplained.
Selection of the minimal model discards many of the niceties of a full-blown Bayesian
approach, such as a complete quantitative evaluation of the likelihood, in favor of a
qualitative evaluation of consistency between each interpretation and the image data. But it
is broadly consistent with Bayesian inference in that each additional “coincidence” entails a
decrease in the likelihood, so minimizing the coincidences also maximizes the likelihood
(see Feldman, 2009). At the same time, this point of view opens the door to the kind of
qualitative inference familiar from much of the perceptual organization literature, which
often entails selecting among a finite set of distinct alternatives (orderings of surfaces,
qualitative classifications of junctions, qualitative classifications of parts, etc.). Moreover,
consistent with the discussion above, Minimal Model theory provides an elegant definition
of “objects,” which are viewed as subtrees of the minimal interpretation bearing a certain
type of logical independence from other subtrees (Feldman, 2003b).
Bayesian network models—In its application to perception, Bayesian theory may be
regarded as a pure computational theory in Marr’s (1982) sense, in that it identifies defining
attributes of a solution to be selected from the space of possible stimulus interpretations, but
does not provide concrete mechanisms for computing it. But a burgeoning literature has
taken up this challenge, proposing computationally feasible procedures for approximating
the Bayesian posterior. Prominent among these are the many variants of Bayesian belief
propagation pioneered by Pearl (1988). In principle, such models may be thought of as
models for neural networks, because (like real neural networks) they involve strictly local
communication between nodes connected by pairwise links. The application of Bayesian
network models to perceptual organization is still in its infancy, notwithstanding some
promising initial steps in the area of figure-ground organization (Froyen, Feldman, & Singh,
2010; Weiss, 1997). But the broader problem of perceptual grouping constitutes a
particularly challenging case for network architectures, because of the need to consider
global qualities of the image in order to arrive at the perceived interpretation—that is, the
very aspect emphasized in the term “Gestalt.” Most neural network models, by design,
consider evidence only across the span of local receptive fields—not the entire image at
once—so adapting them to find global optima may require the development of new
techniques. Still, this direction may be uniquely promising as a way of combining a neural-
like architecture with a well-motivated global objective function.
Conclusion
The Bayesian approach, which has proven to be useful in many areas of perception and
cognition, has offered additional insight into classic Gestalt phenomena such as perceptual
grouping and object formation, and it has provided a foundation to core concepts from
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classic Gestalt theory such as Prägnanz. It also establishes a bridge between likelihood and
simplicity, which will be expanded further in the next section.
Structural Information Theory
Introduction
In order to understand simplicity, we need to understand description complexity, and for that
we need a valid notion of information. In the aftermath of Shannon’s (1948) breakthrough in
communication theory, psychologists started to rethink the concept of information (e.g.,
Attneave, 1954; Garner, 1962; Hochberg & McAlister, 1953; MacKay, 1950; Miller &
Frick, 1949; Quastler, 1955). This led to the rise of representational coding approaches,
which did not quantify the information in a message by the probability of occurrence of the
message (as Shannon did) but by the number of parameters needed to specify its content. In
other words, applied to perception, they focused on the informational content of Gestalts (for
a review, see Hatfield & Epstein, 1985). To this end, they postulated (a) that incoming
stimuli are perceptually organized by operations which capture regularity, and (b) that
Gestalts are reflected by codes that specify the simplest organization (Simon, 1972). Later,
in the 1980s and inspired by an increased understanding of the brain’s neural network,
connectionism began to focus on the flow of information, postulating (a) that this flow is
reflected by activation spreading in a network, and (b) that Gestalts are reflected by stable
patterns of activation (McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981). Still later, in the 1990s, dynamical
systems theory (DST) started to focus on the dynamic transitions from any one neural state
to the next, postulating (a) that these transitions can be described by nonlinear differential
equations, and (b) that Gestalts are reflected by attractors in the brain’s state space, that is,
by relatively stable states towards which the brain can be said to be attracted (Eliasmith,
2001; see also above).
These three approaches (information theory, connectionism, and DST) use different formal
tools to model different aspects, which does not mean that they are mutually exclusive. In
fact, in the spirit of Marr’s (1982) three levels of explanation (computation, algorithm, and
implementation), they may provide complementary insights which—together—may explain
how percepts are the result of cognitive processes implemented in the brain. In the sections
below, this multidisciplinary and typically Gestaltist perspective is sketched starting from
the representational coding approach of Structural Information Theory (SIT).
Central to SIT is the simplicity principle, which holds that percepts correspond to the
simplest descriptive codes, that is, codes which specify stimulus organizations by capturing
a maximum of regularity. The simplicity principle is a descendant of Hochberg and
McAlister’s (1953) minimum principle, and both are information-theoretic translations of
the law of Prägnanz. In the 1960s, Leeuwenberg (1969, 1971) initiated SIT as a
representational coding model of visual pattern classification. Nowadays, it also includes a
theoretically sound and empirically successful quantification of pattern complexity and
empirically successful quantitative models of amodal completion and symmetry perception
(e.g., van der Helm, 1994; van der Helm & Leeuwenberg, 1991, 1996; van der Helm, van
Lier, & Leeuwenberg, 1992; van Lier, 1999; van Lier, van der Helm, & Leeuwenberg,
1994). To avoid a persistent misunderstanding, it is true that SIT’s formal model applies to
symbol strings to code patterns and that relatively much attention in the SIT literature is paid
to how symbol strings might represent visual stimuli. This does not mean, however, that SIT
assumes that the visual system converts visual stimuli into symbol strings. The symbolic
representations (which are not discussed here) merely serve to indicate howSIT’s
information-processing principles might be applied to visual stimuli to attain testable
quantitative predictions.
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In the sections below, we review how SIT dealt with three fundamental questions
concerning perceptual organization. First, we address the question of how veridical simple
stimulus organizations are; to this end, we specify the relationship between simplicity and
likelihood again by means of Bayes’ rule but in a different conceptual framework than the
one used in the preceding section. Second, we address the question of what should be the
nature of the visual regularities to be captured to arrive at simple organizations. Third, we
address the question of how simple organizations might be computed; this issue led to a
representational picture of cognitive architecture, which includes connectionist modeling
ideas and which honors ideas from neuroscience and DST about neuronal synchronization.
The Veridicality of Simplicity
As argued before, the Gestalt school’s simplicity principle contrasts with von Helmholtz’s
(1909/1962) likelihood principle. The latter holds that, for a proximal stimulus, the visual
system chooses the interpretation most likely to be true, that is, the one that most likely
reflects the actual distal stimulus that caused the proximal stimulus. Hence, by definition,
the likelihood principle holds that the visual system is highly veridical with respect to the
external world. This would be nice but to be able to assess this, one needs access to the real
probabilities of occurrence of distal stimuli in the external world, while in fact these
probabilities are unknown, if not unknowable. The simplicity principle, conversely, holds
that the visual system chooses the simplest interpretation, that is, one that can be specified
by a minimum number of descriptive parameters. Hence, by definition, the simplicity
principle holds that the visual system is highly efficient with respect to internal resources.
This would also be nice, but would it yield sufficient veridicality to guide us reliably
through the world? In SIT, this question has been addressed via a line of reasoning that is
reviewed next (for more details, see van der Helm, 2000, 2011a).
In the 1950s and 1960s, not only psychologists, but also mathematicians began to rethink the
concept of information (Kolmogorov, 1965; Solomonoff, 1964a, 1964b). This led to the
mathematical domain of algorithmic information theory (AIT), also known as the theory of
Kolmogorov complexity or the Minimum Description Length principle (see Li & Vitányi,
1997). Solomonoff, in particular, realized that, in many domains, the probabilities with
which events occur are unknown, so that Shannon’s approach cannot be applied to make
reliable inferences. To circumvent this problem, he turned to descriptive codes and proposed
to use artificial probabilities derived from the complexities of these codes (i.e., things with
simpler codes get higher probabilities). He was also the first to prove that this can be
achieved irrespective of the specific descriptive coding language which is used (see also
Simon, 1972). In other words, he showed that simplicity is a fairly stable concept. He also
conjectured that those artificial probabilities are universal probabilities in that they allow for
fairly reliable inferences in many different situations (or “worlds”).
In the 1990s, Solomonoff’s conjecture proved to be valid in the form of the fundamental
inequality (Li & Vitányi, 1997), which holds for an infinite number of imaginable worlds
and implies that simplicity-based inference is more reliable as the probability distribution of
objects in such a world is simpler. Roughly, the complexity of a probability distribution is
given by the number of categories to which it assigns probabilities. Hence, the fundamental
inequality implies that simplicity-based inference is more reliable in a world which contains
fewer categories to be distinguished (e.g., human-made worlds as opposed to natural
worlds). This suggests that the simpler a world is, the more veridical the simplicity principle
will be in that world. This does not imply, however, that the simplicity principle is highly
veridical in any specific world, but instead, that it might be fairly veridical in many different
worlds, possibly including the actual one. (This is where this line of reasoning deviates from
the one by Chater, 1996, and Feldman, 2009, outlined above.)
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Hence, whereas the likelihood principle is a special-purpose principle in that it is adapted to
one specific world with a supposedly known real probability distribution, this line of
reasoning suggests that the simplicity principle is a general-purpose principle which
promises to be fairly (possibly sufficiently) adaptive to many different worlds without
having to know their real probability distributions. The latter is therefore a serious
contender, not only because it is better quantifiable, but also from an evolutionary point of
view, because the survival value of adaptability to changing environments may be higher
when based on a general-purpose principle than a special-purpose one.
Applied to perceptual organization, the discussion above can be sharpened further. To this
end, one has to make a distinction between the prior and the conditional of a candidate
stimulus interpretation, that is, of a hypothesized distal stimulus H that fits a given proximal
stimulus D. In Bayesian terms, the prior is the probability that H occurs independently of D,
and the conditional is the probability that D occurs if H were true. Multiplying the prior and
the conditional then yields, after normalization, the posterior which indicates how likely H is
given D, under the employed priors and conditionals. Thus, the likelihood principle can be
formalized as holding that the visual system chooses the interpretation with the highest
posterior probability, assuming it uses real prior and conditional probabilities. Fair
approximations of conditional probabilities can be determined in principle, but a
fundamental problem remains that the real prior probabilities are unknown. Alternatively,
one might start from the simplicity principle. Then, the prior is the complexity of the
simplest code that specifies H independently of D, and the conditional is the complexity of
the simplest code that specifies D starting from H. Then, summing the prior and the
conditional yields the posterior which indicates how well H fits D. Thus, reflecting Occam’s
razor, the simplicity principle can be formalized as holding that the visual system chooses
the interpretation with the lowest posterior complexity.
Prior and conditional complexities could be converted, as Solomonoff did, into artificial
probabilities to model the simplicity principle in Bayesian terms, but this does not
automatically yield compliance with the real probabilities as assumed by the Helmholtzian
likelihood principle. Indeed, AIT’s fundamental inequality implies that the margin between
such artificial probabilities and real probabilities is roughly equivalent to the number of
categories to be distinguished. In fact, this suggests an interesting difference between priors
and conditionals in vision. Priors apply to viewpoint-independent categories of distal
stimuli, and most worlds give rise to many different categories of distal stimuli; this suggests
that the artificial prior probabilities are not particularly close to the real ones. Conditionals,
however, apply to viewpoint-dependent categories of views of distal stimuli, and each distal
stimulus gives rise to only a few different categories of views; this suggests that the artificial
conditional probabilities might be close to the real ones.
This theoretically inferred difference between priors and conditionals has been supported by
van Lier et al.’s (1994) model of amodal completion. This model treats conditionals
differently than the Minimal Model Theory mentioned above, but it also claims to comply
with Rock’s (1983) avoidance-of-coincidence principle, and it successfully combines prior
and conditional complexities to predict whether, and if so how, patterns are amodally
completed (see Figure 8). While it is impossible to know if the prior complexities after
conversion are close to the real prior probabilities, by all accounts, the conditional
complexities seem to be close to the real conditional probabilities (van der Helm, 2000,
2011a). This is relevant in everyday situations in which a moving observer gets a growing
sample of different views of a same distal scene. It allows the visual system to update its
interpretation with each new view in a process that can be modeled by a recursive
application of Bayes’ rule. During this recursive process, the effect of the first priors fades
away as the priors are updated continuously on the basis of the conditionals which then
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become the decisive entities. Because the simplicity-based artificial conditional probabilities
seem to be close to the real conditional probabilities, simplicity seems to provide sufficient
veridicality in such everyday situations. Thus, a Gestaltist visual system that focuses on
internal efficiency seems to yield external veridicality as a side-effect.
The Nature of Visual Regularity
The veridicality finding discussed above is based on the complexity of the simplest codes
and holds virtually independently of which specific regularities are chosen to be captured to
obtain the simplest codes. However, the primary purpose of such simplest codes in vision is
to yield perceptual organizations, and in this respect, it is crucial to capture visually relevant
regularities (Simon, 1972). Empirically, it is clear that regularities such as mirror symmetry
and repetition are visual regularities (i.e., regularities the visual system is sensitive to), but it
is less clear how to distinguish visual from nonvisual regularities. The traditionally
considered transformational formalization of regularity (advocated most prominently in
perception by Garner, 1974; Palmer, 1983), which proposes a criterion for distinction, seems
suited for object recognition but not for object perception. For instance, it cannot account
well for human detection of perturbed regularities nor for the classical phenomenon that
symmetry is generally much better detectable than repetition (e.g., Bruce & Morgan, 1975;
Corballis & Roldan, 1974; Julesz, 1971; Wagemans, Van Gool, Swinnen, & Van Horebeek,
1993; for review, see Wagemans, 1995, 1997). In SIT, this led to a rethinking of the concept
of visual regularity, which resulted in the formalization and implications sketched next (for
more details, see van der Helm & Leeuwenberg, 1991, 1996, 1999, 2004; for discussion, see
also Olivers, Chater, & Watson, 2004; Wagemans, 1999).
Considering the purpose of regularity detection, visual regularities must meet two general
demands. First, they must allow for an easy build-up of internal representations, and second,
they must allow for the specification of hierarchical organizations of the input. These two
demands are met by the formal properties of holographic regularity and hierarchical
transparency, respectively. A holographic regularity is a regularity with substructures that all
reflect the same kind of regularity; this implies that its representation can be built up easily
from its substructures (see Figure 9). Furthermore, a hierarchically transparent regularity is a
regularity such that any other regularity nested in it is a regularity in its own right (i.e., does
not depend on this nesting); this ensures that codes specify proper hierarchical organizations.
Together, the formal properties of holographic regularity and hierarchical transparency
single out three regularities, namely, repetition (or iteration), (mirror and broken) symmetry,
and alternation (which covers, among others, the regularity in so-called Glass patterns; see
Glass, 1969; Glass & Perez, 1973). Hence, these are the only regularities that meet the
general demands mentioned before (van der Helm & Leeuwenberg, 1991), and in SIT, these
regularities are therefore proposed to be captured to obtain the simplest codes. In other
words, this formalization provides a theoretical foundation for SIT’s coding scheme.
Whether this formalization also captures the nature of visual regularity was addressed by
testing a regularity-detection model derived directly from this formalization. The
formalization suggests that amounts of regularity are to be quantified by the number of non-
redundant holographic identity relationships between stimulus parts (E) that give rise to a
regularity. Applied to symmetry, E equals the number of symmetrically positioned pairs of
identical elements (mirror symmetry is therefore said to have a holographic point structure),
and applied to repetition, E equals the number of repeats minus one, independently of the
number of elements in each repeat (repetition is therefore said to have a holographic block
structure). The model now quantifies the detectability of a regularity in a stimulus by the
weight of evidence (W) for this regularity, where W=E/n with n the total number of
elements in the stimulus (van der Helm & Leeuwenberg, 1996). A converging body of
evidence showed that this holographic model W=E/n provides a fairly comprehensive
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account of the detectability of single and combined regularities, whether or not perturbed by
noise (for reviews, see van der Helm, 2010, 2011b). This suggests that the formalization
described above indeed captures the nature of visual regularity. In other words, a Gestaltist
visual system that focuses on internal efficiency not only seems to yield external veridicality
as a side-effect, but if it achieves this efficiency by capturing transparent holographic
regularities, then it also complies with human regularity detection, which is believed to be
an integral part of the perceptual organization process that is applied to every incoming
stimulus.
Cognitive Architecture
The two findings discussed above establish a viable Gestaltist approach to perceptual
organization. Notice, however, that both findings apply mainly to the question of what is to
be processed rather than how. In fact, any stimulus may give rise to a super-exponential
number of candidate interpretations, so that evaluating each of them separately to select the
simplest one (or one of them, in case of several equally-simple simplest interpretations)
would require more time than is feasible. As we discuss next, this issue has been addressed
in SIT by solving the problem of computing the simplest SIT codes of symbol strings, in a
way that also suggests how the brain might arrive at the simplest interpretations of visual
stimuli (for more details, see van der Helm, 2004, 2012).
In standard connectionist modeling, one fixed “neural” network is assumed to deal with all
possible inputs, and for a specific input, an output is assumed to be selected by activation
spreading in this fixed network (see, e.g., McClelland & Rumelhart, 1981). In contrast,
although SIT assumes that an output is selected in a computationally comparable way, it also
assumes that, preceding this selection, regularity-capturing operations create flexible
“cognitive” networks representing all possible outputs for only the input at hand. For symbol
strings, this idea has been implemented in an algorithm whose essence is sketched next.
For an input string, SIT’s formal model applies coding rules to extract transparent
holographic regularities which have to be recoded in a hierarchically recursive fashion to
compute the simplest code. In theory, a string may contain an exponential number of these
regularities, and recoding each of these regularities separately would require a
superexponential amount of processing time. However, transparent holographic regularities
provably group by nature into special distributed representations called hyperstrings, each
representing an exponential number of similar regularities. Hyperstrings are special in that
they allow this exponential number of similar regularities to be recoded in one go, that is,
simultaneously, as if only one regularity were concerned (see Figure 10). Thus, there is no
need to recode these similar regularities in a serial or parallel fashion, but instead they can
be recoded in a transparallel fashion. Such a transparallel method has been implemented in
an algorithm (van der Helm, 2004), which is neurally plausible in that it incorporates the
three intertwined but functionally distinguishable subprocesses that are believed to occur in
the brain’s visual hierarchy: feed forward feature encoding (an initial tuning of the visual
system to features to which it is sensitive), horizontal feature binding, and recurrent feature
selection.
Notice that horizontal feature binding applies to binding of similar features (in the
algorithm, these are similar transparent holographic regularities gathered in hyperstrings). It
does not apply to integration of different features into percepts, which is taken to result from
recurrent feature selection within the visual hierarchy. This is not to be confused with
recurrent attentional processing starting from beyond the visual hierarchy, which selects
features from already integrated percepts. This functional distinction is somewhat
controversial and not that clear-cut, but it seems to explain the primacy or dominance of
holistic stimulus features in experimental tasks (see Section 2 above).
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Furthermore, the method of transparallel processing by hyperstrings seems to provide a
computational explanation of synchronization in the visual hierarchy. Neuronal
synchronization is the phenomenon that neurons temporarily synchronize their activity in
transient assemblies. As indicated in the section on the dynamical systems approach, there
are various ideas about its cognitive meaning, but both theoretically and empirically, it has
been associated with cognitive processing, and 30–70 Hz gamma-band synchronization in
particular has been associated with feature binding in perceptual organization. In fact, such
temporarily synchronized neural assemblies in the visual hierarchy seem to be horizontal
assemblies which also seem involved in binding similar features (Gilbert, 1992). The model
discussed above now suggests that hyperstrings can be seen as formal counterparts of these
transient horizontal assemblies of synchronized neurons. Thereby, it also suggests that
synchronization in these assemblies can be seen as a manifestation of transparallel
processing of similar features (van der Helm, 2012).
In the model, the intertwined subprocesses of feature encoding and feature binding yield an
input-dependent hierarchical network consisting of hyperstrings, and the subprocess of
feature selection (which is also intertwined) then backtracks this hierarchical network to
obtain the simplest code of the input. Thus, all in all, the model suggests that hyperstring-
like neural assemblies are the constituents of flexible cognitive architecture implemented in
the relatively rigid neural architecture of the brain. For one thing, this picture of flexible
cognitive architecture constituted by hyperstring-like neural assemblies performing
transparallel feature processing does justice to both the high combinatorial capacity and the
high speed characterizing the perceptual organization process. Furthermore, just as
connectionism does, it relies on interactions between pieces of information in distributed
representations, and it relates plausibly to neuronal synchronization whose dynamics is a
typical topic in DST. In other words, this picture of cognitive architecture opens a pluralist
and truly Gestaltist perspective by which complementary insights from representational
theory, connectionism, and DST may be combined to obtain a comprehensive account of
perceptual organization.
Conclusion
Structural Information Theory offers another perspective on the relationship between
simplicity and likelihood, arguing that a Gestaltist visual system that focuses on internal
efficiency yields external veridicality as a side-effect. In addition, it specifies the nature of
the visual regularities that must be extracted to achieve this efficiency (i.e., transparent
holographic regularities) as well as the nature of the cognitive architecture that explains how
the simplest organizations are computed (i.e., transparallel processing by hyperstrings).
General Discussion and Conclusion
Gestalt psychology took phenomenal experience as the starting point of its theoretical
considerations. We reviewed perceptual grouping and figure-ground organization in the first
paper (Anonymous Author list, 2012) and included a large number of Gestalt phenomena in
the present paper (configural superiority, global precedence, switching between multistable
organizations, apparent motion, object formation, and regularity detection). Such Gestalt
phenomena are real and reliable, and they are still the subject of intense investigations to
date, independently of the framework in which they arose. In a way, the parts are less than
the whole: The theoretical endeavors of the Gestaltists did not similarly stand the test of
time. They failed to provide a thorough specification of the concepts of Gestalts as
configurations of parts and wholes, and the mechanisms underlying the law of Prägnanz as
based on a neural isomorphism did not work out. This does not mean that we should reject
their intuitions. They protect us from falling back on a naïve mechanistic view, in which
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perception begins with isolated sensations, thereby denying that phenomenal experience is
populated by “Gestalten”—integrated, coherent structures or forms.
The traditional Gestalt notions have been given fresh blood and a solid backbone from
several modern perspectives, reviewed in the present paper. The conceptual and theoretical
foundations of Gestalt psychology have been reconsidered in both descriptive and
explanatory frameworks.
Descriptive Frameworks
Theories may be discarded but the phenomena do not go away. Many researchers
sympathetic to the Gestalt intuitions from a variety of different theoretical convictions have,
therefore, made efforts to specify the description by importing theoretical constructs from a
variety of external sources. In Section 2, we have seen how the initially vague notion of a
holistic Gestalt can be translated into a well-defined concept that allows precise operational
definitions and experimentation.
The first operationalization we discussed is grafted on a notion of representation as a feature
space, where features occupy dimensions. In this representation, Gestalts are emergent
features of which the characteristics are based on but not expressed by the dimensions.
Emergent features are characterized as integral, configural, or separable, based on how
strongly the featural components subsist. Whereas integral means that the whole is
independent of its dimensional components and separable means that dimensional
components subsist as independent perceptual units, configural dimensions occupy a middle
ground that is closest to the original Gestalts: differentiated part-whole structures. Note that
this notion is more systematic but at the same time more restricted than the original notion
of Gestalt, because it is tied to the dimensional representation of its components. The notion
of dimension can be taken literally or it can be extended into the domain of the
metaphorical. Neither way does it offer a connotation of globality that is characteristic of
true Gestalts. Any arbitrary emergent property qualifies, in principle, as configural,
separable, or integral.
A second idea—even further removed from the original, conceptually speaking—is that of
part-wholes being grafted on the notion of a hierarchical tree, in which a Gestalt is the top-
level superstructure, and its substructures are levels of a branching tree. This is the concept
underlying the “forests before trees” studies that have helped to establish empirically the
primacy of the whole in processing, independently of its size or visibility. Here, the notion
of a whole is rigid and well-defined conceptually, but the connotation of a whole being a
force that binds, shapes, and resists external influences on the configuration of its parts, is
entirely missing from this account. There is a difference between the whole having priority
in processing and the Gestalt observation that the whole determines the appearance of its
parts.
In sum, the notion of Gestalt has taken different shapes in these two descriptive frameworks:
as configurations in a feature-space versus top-level or superstructures in hierarchical trees.
Both descriptions are well-defined and capable of suggesting experiments. Each of them
captures an aspect of Gestalts but neither of them captures the concept in its entirety. Yet,
that may have been too much to expect to begin with: Concepts developed closely to
experience are not easily expressed in any formalism.
Explanatory Frameworks
We may have answered the need to specify the phenomena to a certain extent, but we are
even further removed from answering the question of how to explain the phenomena. Here
again, Gestalt theory has intuitions to offer that are worthy of pursuing with today’s
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instruments: Gestalts emerge spontaneously from self-organizational processes in the brain.
Lacking today’s advanced nonlinear dynamics, probabilistic and symbolic machinery, the
Gestaltists borrowed their explanatory principles from the only source available at the time:
the theory of global electrostatic field forces. These are systems residing at equilibria of least
energy expenditure, which is at the same time also the simplest possible organization, given
the available stimulation (i.e., the law of Prägnanz). With the dismissal of global field theory
as a principle for brain organization, the Gestalt concept fragmented, and self-organization,
economy, the simplest possible, and “given the available stimulation” each became the
starting point for four, quite divergent approaches, each of which has been brought in to
specify the Gestalt intuition further from a modern perspective.
In Section 3 we saw the aspect of self-organization highlighted in a dynamical systems
approach to perceptual organization. It claims a solution to the problem of the previous
approach: What are the neural mechanisms by which the system achieves optimality? The
answer is provided, at least in principle, by the complexity of the neural dynamics that help
configure the global architecture of the system, given simple mechanisms of neural growth
and adaptation (Gong & van Leeuwen, 2003; Rubinov et al., 2009; van den Berg, Gong,
Breakspear, & van Leeuwen, 2012). In addition, this approach does justice to perception as
part of an ongoing process instead of a delineated process going from static inputs to static
outputs, as in naïve mechanistic approaches. As a counterweight to its potential, however,
there are also challenges. For instance, how do we explain the functionality of the system at
the level of its behavior? Provided that the system dynamics explains that we perceive
Gestalts, which principle governs the selection of those Gestalts that are functional to the
system “given the available stimulation” rather than arbitrary others? This could be a matter
of selection at an evolutionary level (van Leeuwen, 2007) but how this selection interacts
with the proposed mechanisms of neural growth and adaptation remains to be clarified.
The principle of economy was given a specification in terms of the optimization of available
resources in Section 4. We observed that a system of sensors that work independently at the
neural level to minimize its uncertainty, is collectively responding optimally to the available
patterns of stimulation. It remains an open question whether the proposed mechanism is
implemented at the neural level as proposed, and whether it generalizes beyond the realm of
motion sensitivity, where it was developed. Clearly, however, these are sophisticated
empirical questions, hinting at the great versatility and potential of addressing modern
neuroscience from a Gestalt-inspired, holistic perspective. Such questions can now be asked
because the general framework has been spelled out, and the necessary tools are now
available to be able to test the psychophysical and neural predictions and to model the
results, extracting principles, and formulating them quantitatively.
Section 5 specified the conditional “given the available stimulation” in terms of likelihood,
which motivated a Bayesian approach to perception. In general, the Bayesian approach has
been successful in explaining grouping principles such as proximity and good continuation,
and it has provided a solid basis to typical Gestalt notions such as objecthood and Prägnanz.
Yet, ultimately, all Bayesian theories face the same problem: How to select their priors?
Simply put: We may perceive patterns in accordance with the Gestalt law of symmetry
because the more symmetrical arrangement is most likely, but why is symmetry relevant to
begin with?
This question is addressed in Section 6, where the aspect of simplicity is considered within
the context of Structural Information Theory (SIT). This approach has seen substantial
development but has retained is roots as an essentially symbolic theory. It states that patterns
are preferred according to the greatest simplicity of their symbolic description. The
operators used in the symbolic description, such as symmetry, are not arbitrary according to
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SIT, but based on principled properties of its description language. Over the past decades,
SIT has successfully formalized the principles of the language, and solved the problems
relating to the computational complexity of their encoding framework. It could be shown
that a Gestaltist visual system focusing on internal efficiency yields external veridicality as a
side-effect, extracting visual regularities in a way that seems to characterize perceptual
organization as applied to every incoming stimulus. However, it shares one problem with all
symbolic (or even all formal) theories of perception: It must indicate (as van der Helm,
2012, has recently begun to do) how SIT’s encoding algorithms can be mapped onto the way
in which the visual system encodes visual information. Real scenes do not consist of
discrete, static features, but of continuous and cluttered presentations, in which—over time
—various parts are revealed and occluded. What are the units of the visual system’s coding
language then? In some visual stimuli, we perceive symmetries and other regularities that
are not even supported by features in the input (e.g., illusory contours). We cannot
understand the Kanizsa triangle as simply a result of binding the features of the visual input,
since the features of the triangle are not actually present in the display. This means that the
visual system plays an active role in the very constitution of features that it assumes to be
given. That insight in turn may help us understand Köhler’s (1929/1947) key notion of the
experience error, wherein we mistakenly attribute our sensory experience to the proximal
stimulus activating our receptors.
Conclusion
In sum, the various diverging theoretical approaches that have been motivated by Gestalt
problems have all made considerable progress at certain aspects of the conceptual problems,
yet none of them has solved the conundrum of Gestalt in its entirety. However, each
individual approach, from its own internal consistency, motivates additional detailed
research questions which can now be addressed fruitfully. Most importantly, the further
specification of the connections between the frameworks, as we have started to do here, will
be essential for a synthesis into the conceptually coherent framework which Gestalt theory
once was. As the proverbial blind men and the elephant, only together will they make
progress in addressing the problem which, a century after its origination, is still in the
frontier of scientific exploration: Why do things look as they do? Koffka (1935, p. 98)
claimed: “Things look as they do because of the field organization to which the proximal
stimulus distribution gives rise. This answer is final and can be so only because it contains
the whole problem of organization itself.” Contemporary vision scientists will not rest until
they have addressed all the aspects of this “final” answer to everyone’s satisfaction: the laws
of perceptual organization, faithful to perceptual experience, yet formulated in precise
quantitative terms, fully explained in terms of their internal dynamics and ecological
validity, spelled out at an algorithmic level and linked to its neural mechanisms, from single
neurons to neuronal cell assemblies and whole systems.
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Figure 1.
Emergent features in visual search (adapted from Pomerantz et al., 1977), demonstrating
configural superiority. Adding redundant elements to each of the stimuli improves detection
of the odd element in the display, but only when certain emergent features arise (such as
closure in A or symmetry in C).
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Figure 2.
Four sets of four stimuli each, produced by the orthogonal combination of type of property
and level of structure (adapted from Kimchi, 1994).
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Figure 3.
A simple dynamical system model for perceptual switching characterized by two meta-
stable states.
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Figure 4.
(A) Space-time graph (t, s). Two lights are flashed at distinct locations represented by two
circles at coordinates t and s. (B) Distance graph. The same stimulus is represented by a
filled circle in a graph of distances (T, S)=(Δt,Δs). (C-D) Regimes of apparent motion. Two
stimuli (represented by filled circles 1 and 2) are shown in each distance graph: one at (T, S)
and the other at (2T, nS). In Stimulus 2 the temporal distance is twice longer, and the spatial
distance is n times longer, than in Stimulus 1. What is the magnitude of n (n>0) at which the
two stimuli are equally strong? The answer has been inconsistent. According to some
studies, the answer is n>1 (“distance coupling” in C), by others it is n<1 (“distance tradeoff”
in D).
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Figure 5. Equivalence contours
The colored curves are the contours of contrast sensitivity reproduced in the distance graph
from the spatiotemporal frequency graph of Kelly (1979), using methods explained in
Gepshtein and Kubovy (2007). Contour slopes vary across the graph, consistent with the
regimes of coupling and tradeoff of apparent motion in different parts of the graph. The two
pairs of connected circles are two examples of where different regimes of apparent motion
are expected if strength of apparent motion was predicted by contrast sensitivity.
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Figure 6.
(A) Information cells and uncertainty tradeoff. The three rectangles are the information
cells. Their projections on dimensions x and fx represent, respectively, the precision of
measuring signal location and content: the larger the projection, the lower the precision
(higher uncertainty) of measurement. The cells have the same area (product of intervals on x
and fx) but their shapes vary. (B) Uncertainty functions in one dimension. Curves B1 and B2
are the uncertainty functions associated with measuring signal location and content, by a
sensor of size Ax. The values of B1 and B2 are proportional to, respectively, the horizontal
and vertical extents of the information cells in panel A. B3 is a joint-uncertainty function. It
represents the uncertainty of simultaneous measurement of stimulus location and content.
Low values of B3 at intermediate magnitudes of Ax indicate that sensors of intermediate size
are most suitable for jointly measuring signal location and content.
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Figure 7.
(A) Interaction of spatial and temporal uncertainties. The gray panel on the bottom is a
distance graph. Each point of it corresponds to two information cells: temporal and spatial.
Some of the corresponding logons are shown in the temporal and spatial (x, f) planes in the
left and right planes. (B) Spatiotemporal uncertainty function. The red curves represent one-
dimensional uncertainty functions: temporal and spatial. The functions describe
uncertainties of jointly measuring signal location and signal content (as in Figure 6B),
separately in space and time. Summing the spatial and temporal uncertainties for every
combination of spatial and temporal distances yields a bivariate uncertainty function, shown
as a surface. The circular contours in the distance graph on the bottom are projections of
level curves of this surface. Each contour represents a set of equal uncertainty. The red dot is
a projection of the minimum of uncertainty. (Panel A is adapted from Gepshtein, 2010, and
panel B from Gepshtein et al., 2007.)
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Figure 8.
The proximal pattern in (a) is readily interpreted as a parallelogram partly occluding the
shape in (b) rather than the shape in (c). By the likelihood principle, this could be explained
by arguing that (c) would have to take a more coincidental position to yield (a); this
argument relies on real conditional probabilities and ignores real prior probabilities which
are unknown but which, if included, might well undermine this argument. By the simplicity
principle, the prior complexities (of the objects as such) and the conditional complexities (of
the objects’ relative positions in the pattern) converge on a predicted preference for the
shape in (b).
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Figure 9.
Holographic regularity. A symmetry (at the left) can be expanded by one symmetry pair at a
time (dashed arc) preserving its symmetrical nature, and a repetition (at the right) can,
independently of the number of elements in each repeat, be expanded by one repeat at a time
preserving its repetition nature.
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Figure 10.
The 15 strings at the top are such that they can be represented each by a path from vertex 1
to vertex 9 in a distributed representation. This distributed representation is a hyperstring:
every pair of subgraphs (here, e.g., the grey ones) represent substring sets that are either
completely identical or completely disjoint -- never something in between. This property
implies that the 15 strings can be searched for regularities in a transparallel fashion, that is,
in one go, or in other words, simultaneously as if only one string were concerned.
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 su
gg
es
ts 
ho
w
 th
e 
br
ai
n
m
ig
ht
 a
rri
ve
 a
t t
he
 si
m
pl
es
t i
nt
er
pr
et
at
io
ns
 o
f v
isu
al
 st
im
ul
i
•
tr
an
sp
ar
al
le
l r
ec
od
in
g 
of
 h
yp
er
str
in
gs
 o
f t
ra
ns
pa
re
nt
 h
ol
og
ra
ph
ic
 re
gu
la
rit
ie
s h
as
 b
ee
n 
im
pl
em
en
te
d 
in
 a
 n
eu
tra
lly
 p
la
us
ib
le
al
go
rit
hm
 th
at
 in
co
rp
or
at
es
 th
re
e 
su
bp
ro
ce
ss
es
 in
 th
e 
br
ai
n’
s v
isu
al
 h
ie
ra
rc
hy
: f
ee
df
or
w
ar
d 
fe
at
ur
e 
en
co
di
ng
, h
or
iz
on
ta
l f
ea
tu
re
bi
nd
in
g,
 a
nd
 re
cu
rre
nt
 fe
at
ur
e 
se
le
ct
io
n
 
6.
5.
Co
nc
lu
sio
n
•
SI
T 
of
fe
rs
 a
no
th
er
 p
er
sp
ec
tiv
e 
on
 th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
sim
pl
ic
ity
 a
nd
 li
ke
lih
oo
d,
 a
rg
ui
ng
 th
at
 a
 G
es
ta
lti
st 
vi
su
al
 sy
ste
m
 th
at
fo
cu
se
s o
n 
in
te
rn
al
 e
ffi
ci
en
cy
 y
ie
ld
s e
xt
er
na
l v
er
id
ic
al
ity
 a
s a
 si
de
-e
ffe
ct
•
SI
T 
sp
ec
ifi
es
 th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f t
he
 v
isu
al
 re
gu
la
rit
ie
s t
ha
t m
us
t b
e 
ex
tra
ct
ed
 to
 a
ch
ie
ve
 th
is 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
(i.
e.,
 tr
an
sp
are
nt 
ho
log
rap
hic
re
gu
la
rit
ie
s) 
as 
we
ll a
s t
he
 na
tur
e o
f t
he
 co
gn
itiv
e a
rch
ite
ctu
re 
tha
t e
xp
lai
ns
 ho
w 
the
 si
mp
les
t o
rga
niz
ati
on
s a
re 
co
mp
ute
d (
i.e
.,
tr
an
sp
ar
al
le
l p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
by
 h
yp
er
str
in
gs
)
7.
G
en
er
al
 D
isc
us
sio
n 
an
d 
C
on
cl
us
io
n
•
th
e 
G
es
ta
lti
sts
 fa
ile
d 
to
 p
ro
vi
de
 a
 th
or
ou
gh
 sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
co
nc
ep
ts 
of
 G
es
ta
lts
 a
s c
on
fig
ur
at
io
ns
 o
f p
ar
ts 
an
d 
w
ho
le
s, 
an
d 
th
e
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s u
nd
er
ly
in
g 
th
e 
la
w
 o
f P
rä
gn
an
z 
as
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
a 
ne
ur
al
 is
om
or
ph
ism
 d
id
 n
ot
 w
or
k 
ou
t
•
ho
w
ev
er
, t
he
ir 
in
tu
iti
on
s p
ro
te
ct
 u
s f
ro
m
 fa
lli
ng
 b
ac
k 
on
 a
 n
aï
ve
 m
ec
ha
ni
sti
c 
vi
ew
, i
n 
w
hi
ch
 p
er
ce
pt
io
n 
be
gi
ns
 w
ith
 is
ol
at
ed
se
n
sa
tio
ns
, t
he
re
by
 d
en
yi
ng
 th
at
 p
he
no
m
en
al
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e 
is 
po
pu
la
te
d 
by
 “
G
es
ta
lte
n”
 a
s i
nt
eg
ra
te
d,
 c
oh
er
en
t s
tru
ct
ur
es
 o
r f
or
m
s
•
th
e 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
 a
nd
 th
eo
re
tic
al
 fo
un
da
tio
ns
 o
f G
es
ta
lt 
ps
yc
ho
lo
gy
 h
av
e 
be
en
 g
iv
en
 fr
es
h 
bl
oo
d 
an
d 
a 
so
lid
 b
ac
kb
on
e 
in
 b
ot
h
de
sc
rip
tiv
e 
an
d 
ex
pl
an
at
or
y 
fra
m
ew
or
ks
 
7.
1.
D
es
cr
ip
tiv
e 
Fr
am
ew
or
ks
•
th
e 
in
iti
al
ly
 v
ag
ue
 n
ot
io
n 
of
 a
 h
ol
ist
ic
 G
es
ta
lt 
ca
n 
be
 tr
an
sla
te
d 
in
to
 a
 w
el
l-d
ef
in
ed
 c
on
ce
pt
 th
at
 a
llo
w
s p
re
ci
se
 o
pe
ra
tio
na
l
de
fin
iti
on
s a
nd
 e
xp
er
im
en
ta
tio
n,
 in
 tw
o 
w
ay
s:
1.
as
 c
o
n
fig
ur
at
io
ns
 in
 a
 fe
at
ur
e 
sp
ac
e
2.
as
 s
u
pe
rs
tru
ct
ur
es
 in
 h
ie
ra
rc
hi
ca
l t
re
es
•
bo
th
 d
es
cr
ip
tio
ns
 a
re
 w
el
l-d
ef
in
ed
 a
nd
 c
ap
ab
le
 o
f s
ug
ge
sti
ng
 e
xp
er
im
en
ts,
 b
ut
 n
ei
th
er
 o
f t
he
m
 c
ap
tu
re
s t
he
 G
es
ta
lt 
co
nc
ep
t i
n 
its
en
tir
et
y;
 h
en
ce
, t
he
re
 a
re
 c
le
ar
ly
 re
m
ai
ni
ng
 c
ha
lle
ng
es
:
1.
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
th
e 
co
nn
ot
at
io
n 
of
 g
lo
ba
lit
y 
th
at
 is
 c
ha
ra
ct
er
ist
ic
 o
f t
ru
e 
G
es
ta
lts
; a
ny
 a
rb
itr
ar
y 
em
er
ge
nt
 p
ro
pe
rty
qu
al
ifi
es
, i
n 
pr
in
ci
pl
e,
 a
s c
on
fig
ur
al
, s
ep
ar
ab
le
, o
r i
nt
eg
ra
l
2.
it 
do
es
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
th
e 
co
nn
ot
at
io
n 
of
 a
 w
ho
le
 b
ei
ng
 a
 fo
rc
e 
th
at
 b
in
ds
, s
ha
pe
s, 
an
d 
re
sis
ts 
ex
te
rn
al
 in
flu
en
ce
s o
n 
th
e
co
n
fig
ur
at
io
n 
of
 it
s p
ar
ts;
 th
er
e 
is 
a 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
w
ho
le
 h
av
in
g 
pr
io
rit
y 
in
 p
ro
ce
ss
in
g 
an
d 
th
e 
G
es
ta
lt
o
bs
er
va
tio
n 
th
at
 th
e 
w
ho
le
 d
et
er
m
in
es
 th
e 
ap
pe
ar
an
ce
 o
f i
ts 
pa
rts
 
7.
2.
Ex
pl
an
at
or
y 
Fr
am
ew
or
ks
•
G
es
ta
lt 
th
eo
ry
’s
 in
tu
iti
on
 a
bo
ut
 G
es
ta
lts
 e
m
er
gi
ng
 sp
on
ta
ne
ou
sly
 fr
om
 se
lf-
or
ga
ni
za
tio
na
l p
ro
ce
ss
es
 in
 th
e 
br
ai
n 
w
as
 sp
ec
ifi
ed
 b
y
th
e 
th
eo
ry
 o
f g
lo
ba
l e
le
ct
ro
sta
tic
 fi
el
d 
fo
rc
es
: s
ys
te
m
s r
es
id
in
g 
at
 e
qu
ili
br
ia
 o
f l
ea
st 
en
er
gy
 e
xp
en
di
tu
re
, w
hi
ch
 is
 a
t t
he
 sa
m
e 
tim
e
al
so
 th
e 
sim
pl
es
t p
os
sib
le
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n,
 g
iv
en
 th
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
sti
m
ul
at
io
n 
(i.
e.,
 th
e l
aw
 of
 Pr
äg
na
nz
)
•
w
ith
 th
e 
di
sm
iss
al
 o
f g
lo
ba
l f
ie
ld
 th
eo
ry
 a
s a
 p
rin
ci
pl
e 
fo
r b
ra
in
 o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n,
 th
e 
G
es
ta
lt 
co
nc
ep
t f
ra
gm
en
te
d:
 e
co
no
m
y,
 se
lf-
o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n,
 th
e 
sim
pl
es
t p
os
sib
le
, a
nd
 “
gi
ve
n 
th
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
sti
m
ul
at
io
n”
 e
ac
h 
be
ca
m
e 
th
e 
sta
rti
ng
 p
oi
nt
 fo
r f
ou
r d
iv
er
ge
nt
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
, e
ac
h 
sp
ec
ify
in
g 
th
e 
G
es
ta
lt 
in
tu
iti
on
 fu
rth
er
 fr
om
 a
 m
od
er
n 
pe
rs
pe
ct
iv
e:
1.
Se
ct
io
n 
3 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 se
lf-
or
ga
ni
za
tio
n 
in
 a
 d
yn
am
ic
al
 sy
ste
m
s a
pp
ro
ac
h 
to
 p
er
ce
pt
ua
l o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n,
 e
xp
la
in
in
g 
ho
w
 th
e
sy
ste
m
 a
ch
ie
ve
s o
pt
im
al
ity
 b
y 
th
e 
co
m
pl
ex
ity
 o
f t
he
 n
eu
ra
l d
yn
am
ic
s t
ha
t h
el
p 
co
nf
ig
ur
e 
th
e 
gl
ob
al
 a
rc
hi
te
ct
ur
e 
of
 th
e
sy
ste
m
, g
iv
en
 si
m
pl
e 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s o
f n
eu
ra
l g
ro
w
th
 a
nd
 a
da
pt
at
io
n;
 in
 a
dd
iti
on
, t
hi
s a
pp
ro
ac
h 
do
es
 ju
sti
ce 
to
Psychol Bull. Author manuscript; available in PMC 2013 July 30.
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
N
IH
-PA Author M
anuscript
Wagemans et al. Page 60
Se
ct
io
n 
N
o.
Se
ct
io
n 
Ti
tle
Qu
est
ion
s, 
Iss
ue
s, 
An
sw
er
s, 
Re
ma
ini
ng
 C
ha
lle
ng
es
pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
as
 p
ar
t o
f a
n 
on
go
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s i
ns
te
ad
 o
f a
 d
el
in
ea
te
d 
pr
oc
es
s g
oi
ng
 fr
om
 st
at
ic
 in
pu
ts 
to
 st
at
ic
 o
ut
pu
ts,
 a
s i
n
n
aï
ve
 m
ec
ha
ni
sti
c 
ap
pr
oa
ch
es
2.
Se
ct
io
n 
4 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
e o
f e
co
no
m
y 
in
 te
rm
s o
f t
he
 o
pt
im
iz
at
io
n 
of
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
re
so
ur
ce
s; 
w
e 
ob
se
rv
ed
 th
at
 a
sy
ste
m
 o
f s
en
so
rs
 th
at
 w
or
k 
in
de
pe
nd
en
tly
 a
t t
he
 n
eu
ra
l l
ev
el
 to
 m
in
im
iz
e 
its
 u
nc
er
ta
in
ty
, i
s c
ol
le
ct
iv
el
y 
re
sp
on
di
ng
o
pt
im
al
ly
 to
 th
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
pa
tte
rn
s o
f s
tim
ul
at
io
n
3.
Se
ct
io
n 
5 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 th
e c
on
di
tio
na
l “
gi
ve
n 
th
e a
va
ila
bl
e s
tim
ul
ati
on
” i
n 
te
rm
s o
f l
ik
el
ih
oo
d,
 w
hi
ch
 m
ot
iv
at
ed
 a
B
ay
es
ia
n 
ap
pr
oa
ch
 to
 p
er
ce
pt
io
n;
 th
is 
al
lo
w
ed
 a
 sy
nt
he
tic
 v
ie
w
 o
n 
sim
pl
ic
ity
 a
nd
 li
ke
lih
oo
d,
 a
 c
oh
er
en
t e
xp
la
na
tio
n 
of
gr
ou
pi
ng
 p
rin
ci
pl
es
 su
ch
 a
s p
ro
xi
m
ity
 a
nd
 g
oo
d 
co
nt
in
ua
tio
n,
 a
nd
 a
 so
lid
 b
as
is 
to
 ty
pi
ca
l G
es
ta
lt 
no
tio
ns
 su
ch
 a
s
o
bje
cth
oo
d a
nd
 Pr
äg
na
nz
4.
Se
ct
io
n 
6 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 si
m
pl
ic
ity
 
w
ith
in
 th
e 
co
nt
ex
t o
f S
IT
, s
ta
tin
g 
th
at
 p
at
te
rn
s a
re
 p
re
fe
rre
d 
ac
co
rd
in
g 
to
 th
e 
gr
ea
te
st
sim
pl
ic
ity
 o
f t
he
ir 
sy
m
bo
lic
 d
es
cr
ip
tio
n,
 u
sin
g 
op
er
at
or
s t
ha
t a
re
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
pr
in
ci
pl
ed
 p
ro
pe
rti
es
 o
f i
ts 
de
sc
rip
tio
n
la
ng
ua
ge
, f
or
m
al
iz
in
g 
th
e 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
 o
f t
he
 la
ng
ua
ge
, a
nd
 so
lv
in
g 
th
e 
pr
ob
le
m
s r
el
at
in
g 
to
 th
e 
co
m
pu
ta
tio
na
l
co
m
pl
ex
ity
 o
f t
he
ir 
en
co
di
ng
 fr
am
ew
or
k
•
at
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
tim
e,
 e
ac
h 
of
 th
es
e 
ex
pl
an
at
or
y 
fra
m
ew
or
ks
 is
 a
lso
 c
on
fro
nt
ed
 w
ith
 re
m
ai
ni
ng
 c
ha
lle
ng
es
:
1.
it 
re
m
ai
ns
 a
n 
op
en
 q
ue
sti
on
 w
he
th
er
 th
e 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
 is
 re
al
ly
 im
pl
em
en
te
d 
at
 th
e 
ne
ur
al
 le
ve
l a
s p
ro
po
se
d,
 a
nd
 w
he
th
er
it 
ge
ne
ra
liz
es
 b
ey
on
d 
th
e 
re
al
m
 o
f m
ot
io
n 
se
ns
iti
vi
ty
, w
he
re
 it
 w
as
 d
ev
el
op
ed
2.
ho
w
 d
o 
w
e 
ex
pl
ai
n 
th
e 
fu
nc
tio
na
lit
y 
of
 th
e 
sy
ste
m
 a
t t
he
 le
ve
l o
f i
ts 
be
ha
vi
or
? 
w
hi
ch
 p
rin
ci
pl
e 
go
ve
rn
s t
he
 se
le
ct
io
n 
of
th
os
e 
G
es
ta
lts
 th
at
 a
re
 fu
nc
tio
na
l t
o 
th
e 
sy
ste
m
 “
gi
ve
n 
th
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
sti
m
ul
at
io
n”
 ra
th
er
 th
an
 a
rb
itr
ar
y 
ot
he
rs
? 
ho
w
 d
oe
s
se
le
ct
io
n 
at
 a
n 
ev
ol
ut
io
na
ry
 le
ve
l i
nt
er
ac
t w
ith
 th
e 
pr
op
os
ed
 m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s o
f n
eu
ra
l g
ro
w
th
 a
nd
 a
da
pt
at
io
n?
3.
it 
re
m
ai
ns
 to
 b
e 
se
en
 h
ow
 fr
ui
tfu
l t
hi
s B
ay
es
ia
n 
sy
nt
he
sis
 o
f l
ik
el
ih
oo
d 
an
d 
sim
pl
ic
ity
 w
ill
 b
e 
in
 th
e 
lo
ng
 ru
n;
m
o
re
o
v
er
, 
al
l B
ay
es
ia
n 
th
eo
rie
s f
ac
e 
th
e 
pr
ob
le
m
 o
f e
xp
la
in
in
g 
ho
w
 to
 se
le
ct
 th
e 
pr
io
rs
4.
it 
re
m
ai
ns
 to
 b
e 
stu
di
ed
 fu
rth
er
 h
ow
 S
IT
’s
 e
nc
od
in
g 
al
go
rit
hm
s c
an
 b
e 
m
ap
pe
d 
on
to
 th
e 
w
ay
 in
 w
hi
ch
 th
e 
vi
su
al
sy
ste
m
 e
nc
od
es
 v
isu
al
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n
 
7.
3.
Co
nc
lu
sio
n
•
th
e 
va
rio
us
 th
eo
re
tic
al
 a
pp
ro
ac
he
s t
ha
t h
av
e 
be
en
 m
ot
iv
at
ed
 b
y 
G
es
ta
lt 
pr
ob
le
m
s h
av
e 
al
l m
ad
e 
co
ns
id
er
ab
le
 p
ro
gr
es
s a
t c
er
ta
in
as
pe
ct
s o
f t
he
 c
on
ce
pt
ua
l p
ro
bl
em
s, 
ye
t n
on
e 
of
 th
em
 h
as
 so
lv
ed
 th
e 
co
nu
nd
ru
m
 o
f G
es
ta
lt 
in
 it
s e
nt
ire
ty
; h
en
ce
, t
he
re
 a
re
im
po
rta
nt
 re
m
ai
ni
ng
 c
ha
lle
ng
es
:
•
ea
ch
 in
di
vi
du
al
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
m
ot
iv
at
es
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 d
et
ai
le
d 
re
se
ar
ch
 q
ue
sti
on
s w
hi
ch
 c
an
 n
ow
 b
e 
ad
dr
es
se
d 
fru
itf
ul
ly
•
th
e 
fu
rth
er
 sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
co
nn
ec
tio
ns
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
fra
m
ew
or
ks
, a
s w
e 
ha
ve
 st
ar
te
d 
to
 d
o 
he
re
, w
ill
 b
e 
es
se
nt
ia
l f
or
 a
 sy
nt
he
sis
in
to
 th
e 
co
nc
ep
tu
al
ly
 c
oh
er
en
t f
ra
m
ew
or
k 
w
hi
ch
 G
es
ta
lt 
th
eo
ry
 o
nc
e 
w
as
•
o
n
ly
 to
ge
th
er
 w
ill
 th
es
e 
fra
m
ew
or
ks
 m
ak
e 
pr
og
re
ss
 in
 a
ns
w
er
in
g 
W
hy
 d
o 
th
in
gs
 lo
ok
 as
 th
ey
 d
o?
 
in
 su
ffi
ci
en
t d
et
ai
l, 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
al
l
o
f i
ts 
as
pe
ct
s: 
th
e 
la
w
s o
f p
er
ce
pt
ua
l o
rg
an
iz
at
io
n,
 fa
ith
fu
l t
o 
pe
rc
ep
tu
al
 e
xp
er
ie
nc
e,
 y
et
 fo
rm
ul
at
ed
 in
 p
re
ci
se
 q
ua
nt
ita
tiv
e 
te
rm
s,
fu
lly
 e
xp
la
in
ed
 in
 te
rm
s o
f t
he
ir 
in
te
rn
al
 d
yn
am
ic
s a
nd
 e
co
lo
gi
ca
l v
al
id
ity
, s
pe
lle
d 
ou
t a
t a
n 
al
go
rit
hm
ic
 le
ve
l a
nd
 li
nk
ed
 to
 it
s
n
eu
ra
l m
ec
ha
ni
sm
s, 
fro
m
 si
ng
le
 n
eu
ro
ns
 to
 n
eu
ro
na
l c
el
l a
ss
em
bl
ie
s a
nd
 w
ho
le
 sy
ste
m
s
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